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By C. R. Dale

The need for instruments to measure the movement of fluids and gas in wells has been recognized by engineers for many years. Information regarding flow in the producing interval has a direct bearing on completion practices in new wells and also provides information on the production characteristics of the well. Many hours of engineering time are spent in planning and completing wells but knowledge as to whether or not the original planning has produced the desired results has not always been complete. Many questions such as the following often arise: Why is it that two wells are completed under supposedly identical conditions, yet one well is a good one and the other is a poor one? Are the sands that look the best on the electric log contributing to the production? These and many other conditions in the producing well need to be under- stood in order to develop more efficient production practices and to improve on methods of completing new wells. It is the purpose of this paper to briefly describe one type of instrument, outline the methods of running the equipment and show the results of surveys made under various conditions. With an understanding of the use of this type of survey its importance can be evaluated in relation to the problems encountered by the operator. DESCRIPTION OF INSTRUMENT The instrument is a velocity recorder employing a clock-controlled 16mm film for recording the rpm of an extremely sensitive rotor which is rotated by the flow of fluids or gas in a well. The helical-vaned rotor and shaft, weighing one-half of one ounce are an integral unit exposed to the well fluids and are the only moving parts not enclosed in the fluid-tight housing. No packing or fluid seal of these parts is necessary and the shaft is mounted top and bottom on special jeweled bearings. Fig. A is the lower part of the instrument showing rotor and shaft with the protecting housing sleeve removed. The rpm of the rotor is recorded on the moving film by a combination electrical and optical system. The record is a series of dashes on the film, each dash and space representing twenty (20) revolutions of the rotor. (Film record of survey made in California well showing station recordings at various depths.) As the movement of the film is controlled by the clock the number of dashes and spaces in one minute of film travel represents the rpm of the rotor. The range of the instrument is from 0 to 2,500 rprn. The barrel or housing is 1-11/16 in. OD and seven feet long. Various types of expanding fluid traps are attached to the lower end of the instrument to direct the flow through the 1 in. orifice containing the rotor. The fluid trap for upward flow is shown in Figs. B and C. This assembly consists of eight arms with light spring

Jan 1, 1949

By R. L. Rickett, W. C. Leslie

The influence of deoxidation practice, prior thermal history, and aging time and temperature on the strain-aging behavior of low-carbon open-hearth steels was investigated. The criterion of aging employed was the increase in yield strength in the tensile test, after straining and aging. Composition, prior heat treatment, and aging conditions were all found to be important in governing the strain-aging characteristics of these steels. THAT deoxidation changes the strain-aging propensities of low-carbon steels has been known for a long time, but there has been little agreement, and even contradiction, between results obtained by different investigators and between results obtained in the laboratory and in the mill. This investigation was begun in the hope that some of the uncertainties connected with the strain aging of commercial steels could be eliminated. In considering this problem, it was necessary to define strain aging and to examine the methods used to measure this property. Strain aging can be defined as the changes in properties of a metal or alloy with time, after cold working. The rate at which these changes occur increases as the temperature is raised above atmospheric. The requisite plastic strain is the principal distinction between strain aging and quench aging, the latter being due to precipitation from supersaturated solid solution. Strain aging is also characterized by rapid attainment of maximum hardness at high aging temperatures and lack of softening (overaging) at low aging temperatures. Several possible criteria of strain aging have been listed by Sachsl and by Davenport and Bain.' Because changes in mechanical properties are the most easily measured and the most commonly used, consideration of methods to be used in this investigation was confined to three tests: tensile, notch-impact, and hardness. Hardness tests are the most economical and easiest to perform, but produce only one measure of strain aging. Also, as pointed out by Felmly, Hartbower, and Pellini,³ hardness changes due to aging are not pronounced for steels containing more than 0.15 pct C. Notch-impact tests require careful preparation of large numbers of specimens. Above and below the transition temperature the test lacks sensitivity; furthermore, it is extremely difficult to impart a uniform strain to the specimens, followed quickly by aging and final testing; machining must generally take place after straining. For these reasons, the tensile test was selected for use. Although this test requires a considerable expenditure of time, labor, and money in preparation of the specimens and performance of the test, more information can be gained than from any other single mechanical test, information which includes upper and lower yield points, yield-point elongation, tensile strength, strain-hardening exponent, reduction of area, and elongation. Low and Gensamer' and Schwartzbart and Low5 lso used the tensile test, taking the increase in flow stress after straining in tension and aging as a measure of strain aging. In our work, as in theirs, each specimen was strained an arbitrary amount, sufficient to pass through the

Jan 1, 1954

By AIME AIME

L. C. GRATON, professor of geology in Harvard University, addressed the New York Section on April 24 on-his impressions of the Rand. His beautifully clear and concise address was delivered without notes, so that what follows is merely a resume of the principal points made. The world is apparently coming to the end of ore discoveries easily made, yet we need metals at a steadily increasing rate. If surface discoveries are to decline, then we must find other ores or use less metals. The probable chances of finding ore are greater in the centers of big production than in new districts, as proved statistically. It is unsafe to say that a field is worked out. Therefore, deep mining holds possibilities and is an interesting study that will progressively gain in importance. The origin of the gold in the banket of the Rand has been a geologic football for a long time. Of the various theories, two have survived: 1. Infiltration into permeable conglomerate beds from deep-seated sources; 2. the placer hypothesis, which holds that gravel beds originally had the gold in them. At present, the second theory is accepted by the majority, as a result of the studies by the Union Geological Survey and by E: F. Mellor which were published about fifteen years ago.

Jan 1, 1929

By E. Maxwell, C. J. Bechtoldt, H. C. Vacher

IN the course of an investigation of the properties of metals at low temperature there was occasion to determine the constitution of four iridium-osmium alloys. There is very little information in the literature1 on the constitution of synthetic Ir-0s alloys. Zvyagintzev' s has made a comprehensive study of different natural Ir-0s alloys and concludes that alloys containing more than 32 pct 0s have the close-packed hexagonal structure of osmium, whereas those containing less than 32 pct 0s have the face-centered cubic structure of iridium. The alloys studied in this work were prepared by the American Platinum Works, Newark, N. J., and were received in the form of fragments approximately 1.5 mm average diameter. The fragments had been obtained by crushing ingots made by fusing charges of iridium and osmium under an arc and air cooling. The ingots were not given a homogenizing heat treatment. Sample fragments Table I. Results of X-Roy Diffraction and Microscopic Examinations Phases Present as Determined by X-ray Diffraction Osmium Alloy Close- Iridium Face- Packed Centered Osmium, Iridium, Hexagonal Cubic Mlcro- WtPot Wt Pct Structure Structure scope 0 99.9 None Present 1 23.6 76.4 None Present 1 38.7 61.3 Present Present 2 59.4 40.6 Present Present 2 79.0 21.0 Present Not detected 2 99.9 0 Present None 1 Note: Chemical analyses of the iridium, osmium, and alloys were furnished by the American Platinum Works. of the iridium and osmium used in making the alloys also were included. Several fragments of each metal and alloy were examined microscopically and by X-ray diffraction. For the X-ray method the fragments were crushed further to pass a 270-mesh screen, then sealed in evacuated fused-silica tubes, heated to 1100°C for 18 hr, and allowed to cool in the furnace. Powder X-ray diffraction patterns were obtained from the annealed fragments by means of a Norelco camera having a diameter of 114 mm, and unfiltered cobaIt radiation. For the microscopic examination several fragments in the as-received condition were mounted in Melmac, (American Cyanamid Co.) and ground using the conventional series of abrasive papers. The polishing was done with 0-2 diamond abrasive on a Microcloth (Buehler Ltd.) lap, wet with xylene. After polishing, the surface was etched electrolytically in a 10 pct solution of chromic acid or in a 10 pct solution of potassium cyanide. Both reagents attacked the osmium-rich constituent, whereas the iridium constituent was attacked slightly by the chromic acid reagent and not noticeably by the potassium cyanide reagent. The results of the X-ray diffraction and microscopic examinations are summarized in Table I. Fig. 1 shows the microstructure of a 21 pct Ir-79 pct 0s alloy. The results indicate an appreciable solid-solu-bility range of osmium in iridium as was reported by Zvyagintzev.' The solid-solubility range of iridium in osmium is more restricted, apparently less than 21 pct Ir. This implies a large range of composition in which two phases can coexist that was not reported by Zvyagintzev.

Jan 1, 1955

By T. S. Fuller

VARIOUS phases of the embrittlement of solid copper containing oxygen by the action of reducing gases at high temperatures through the work of many experimenters are familiar to readers of metallurgical literature. In 1900, Heyn1 recorded observations of copper being heated in hydrogen with the development of fine cracks, the result of the formation of steam within the metal through the action of hydrogen on the copper oxide usually found in copper. Archbutt,2 in 1905, published the results of experiments, showing that all oxygen can be removed from copper by heating to redness, for several hours, in hydrogen. Intercrystalline cracks and extreme brittleness developed. Archbutt attributed the brittleness to the reduction of oxides present in the copper. Bengough and Hill,3 in 1910, encountered the now well-known embrittlement at the outset of their investigation and stated in their paper: It soon became evident that the effect of any heat treatment depended largely on the presence or absence of reducing gases in the atmosphere of the furnace, as well as on its temperature. Hence it became necessary to adopt a somewhat elaborate scheme of heat treatment. The authors found embrittlement in separate experiments due to both hydrogen and carbon monoxide and concluded that: "The gases ruin the alloys after being heated to about 650° C. in their presence."

Jan 2, 1926

By R. F. Domagala

SOME of the results of a program designed to study the kinetics of transformation and related mechanical properties of prototype Zr-X binary alloys systematically are presented here. The object of this program was to provide a sound basis for a scientific approach to the realization of optimum properties in binary zirconium alloys. Alloys of Zr-Mo (eutectoid), Zr-Sn (peritectoid), and Zr-Ti (a and ß isomorphous) were prepared and studied. The data herein are confined to a presentation of the results of studying the eutectoid prototype alloys. The Zr-Mo phase diagram has been determined.&apos; A definitive metallographic study of isothermaily annealed samples prepared from high purity elements served to position a sluggish eutectoid reaction, ß?a + ZrMo2, at 780°C. The compositions of the phases involved in this reaction are: ß, 7.5 ±1 pct Mo; a, <0.18 pct Mo; and ZrMo2, 67.8 pct Mo. Inasmuch as a lower purity sponge zirconium was used in this work boundary placements were rein-vestigated with the less pure alloys. Materials and Procedures Hafnium-free sponge zirconium was used to prepare all ingots. The arc melted hardness of a small button of this zirconium was found to be Vpn 168. Chemical analyses conducted at Armour Research Foucdation are shown in Table I, High purity molybdenum sheet was used as the alloy addition. A typical analysis is shown in Table I. Several 200-g Zr-50 pct Mo alloys were made by arc melting. Crushed granules of this material were used to ensure inqot homogeneity Ailoy ingots were prepared by double melting techniques. First, three 5-lb ingots of each alloy composition were are melted in 2 nonconsumable electrode arc furnace. After melting. the ingots were ground to remove surface defects. A subse-

Jan 1, 1958

By T. R. Armstrong

Total crude oil production in Mexico in the year 1941 is estimated at approxi- mately 41,000,000 bbl.; a daily average of 112,700 bbl. and a decrease of about 5 per cent as compared with the daily average of 120,000 bbl. produced in the year 1940, and nearly 11 per cent decrease as com-

Jan 1, 1942

By T. R. Armstrong

Total crude oil production in Mexico in the year 1941 is estimated at approxi- mately 41,000,000 bbl.; a daily average of 112,700 bbl. and a decrease of about 5 per cent as compared with the daily average of 120,000 bbl. produced in the year 1940, and nearly 11 per cent decrease as com-

Jan 1, 1942

C. A. Stetefeldt, Oakland, Cal.: It has always been assumed by the writer, and also by others, that the silver volatilized by roasting in a Stetefeldt furnace was a minimum as compared with roasting in other furnaces. Now, Mr. Morse records at

Jan 1, 1896

By Lyman H. Hart

Some of the significant facts that will affect the supply and demand for metals during the next few decades are given in this presentation. This is important because the only hope for intelligent guidance of the national destiny depends upon presenting a consistent and accurate picture of basic problems. The metals problems now fomenting are only slightly less important than those precipitating the energy crisis. Admittedly, it is difficult to generate serious thinking on this subject when the world is enjoying easy access to all metals at modest prices. This is possible because of the current world capacity to over-produce, and United States credit standing, at least up to now, has permitted buying freely on world markets. Although both these vital conditions are subject to change, there is little doubt that if the U.S. financial house is kept in order, we can muddle along for a while on a generally expanding, metal-based economy. But should our credit standing be permitted to collapse, or should there be a tightening of world supplies of metals, the nation would immediately find itself in trouble. Unfortunately, clear signals indicate that both of these conditions are threatening. The metal age started many centuries ago, and with the exception of the noble metals, barely a dent was made in world reserves until the present century. Then, as a result of the pioneering ideas of D. C. Jackling and Paul Gemmel, and the willingness of the McNeals, Penroses and Guggenheims to back ideas with money, a virtual explosion of metal production was propagated throughout the world. It is important to examine the causes of this expansion to determine whether it is a trend that may be sustained or whether it is anomalous and therefore attributable to circumstances not likely to be repeated or continued. This period of plenty is a once only phenomenon. Vast metal resources have been sitting around here for eons, while the world was unaware of or unconcerned with their existence. But when population began to grow exponentially, and ways were discovered to use metals to develop machines to do the work of men and animals, the exploitation of raw materials increased at a staggering rate. And now the realization is dawning that minerals are a wasting asset and are beginning to present supply problems that should begin to be of concern. Two main factors have caused this condition; One is the population growth, and the other is the expanding demand for irreplaceable raw materials as nations become more developed. A group of systems analysts, at Massachusetts Institute of Technology in a book Limits of Growth, has warned that at present rates of population growth and resource consumption together with environmental constraints, a point will be reached within 100 years when the world population will become totally incapable of supporting itself. The authors conclude that this end result could be avoided if a planned equilibrium could be established at a lower rate of population growth and resource consumption. Fortunately, there is evidence that the population problem is moderating. The growth rate in the U.S. has decreased from 2.3% per year in 1900 to 1.1% in 1970. But, even at the lower rate, population will double in 70 years. The world rate is greater, and if it continues, world population will rise from 3.5 billion to nearly 10 billion in 50 years. All of these projections are questionable because the dangers of growing population are now being recognized. A marked decrease in growth rate has been noted in the more developed countries-in fact, it was zero in the U.S. in 1972. The other factor affecting consumption of raw materials is the increase in per capita use of most items as individuals become more affluent. Many economists believe that developing countries such as China and India represent a vast future potential market; but there are others, with whom the author agrees, who believe over-population tends to stagnate development. Nevertheless, it is a fact that vigorously developing societies increase consumption at a rate far above their population growth rate.

Jan 1, 1974

By Reaves. M. J.

The title of my talk, "What Happened to the Uranium Boom?" is old news. Certainly it is for this group. All of us that make our living in uranium know that the boom of the last half of the 1970&apos;s is over. U.S. production has been exceeding consumption by more than two to one. Mines and mills are closing and yellowcake prices have been dropping for over 20 months. The gloomy outlook for the industry in the near term has been well documented by soothsayers of various descriptions, your daily newspapers, and in the Nuexco Monthly Reports. I&apos;d like to attempt to describe the next upturn in the market (speculate, really) based upon the clues we&apos;re seeing now. In order to do that, I&apos;d first like to go over briefly, some of the market factors that contributed to the recent price drop and resultant production cutbacks, and then hypothesize on the way these factors are changing and will change. Market prices are greatly affected (maybe even entirely determined) by buyer perceptions. This is particularly true with uranium, because of the long lead times associated with nuclear plant construction and also with conventional mine/mill development. Before the price rise (say, 1975) utility uranium buyers believed that: 1) U.S. producers would have difficulty expanding to meet U.S. demand. 2) Australian and Canadian production was essential to avoid shortages in the early 1980&apos;s. 3) Uranlum prices would continue to rise as demand exceeded supply. 4) Enrichment capacity would become inadequate. It was thought necessary, therefore, to build enriched inventory in the early 1980&apos;s for use in the late 1980&apos;s. Artificially accelerated expansion of the uranium producer industry was necessary to accommodate anticipated enrichment demand. Current perceptions are largely the opposite. These are the beliefs that were held most of this year and late last year as prices dropped. 1) U.S. production is far in excess of domestic need. Contraction of the U.S. production lndustry is necessary. 2) Canadian and Australian supply is optional and not essential. Producers in those countries are expanding mainly by displacing higher cost production and not because they fill a void, 3) Prices may be essentially stable for some time. 4) Enriched uranium is in excess supply. That is 1981. 1982 is shaping up to look like this: 1) Prices will have bottomed out. (That is not Nuexco&apos;s opinion necessarily, by the way, but it is my opinion.) 2) There will still be substantial utility inventories, but fewer spot sales. 3) Canadian and perhaps Australian sellers will have made substantial sales in the U.S. and will be aggressively seeking more. 4) U.S. production will have been dramatically curtailed. U.S. utilities that wish to con- tract long term will have difficulty in finding domestic sellers. Concern will develop about the availability of U.S. production capability. Virtually all long term con- tracts signed will be with non-U.S. sellers. 5) An awareness will begin to develop among U.S. buyers that we are approaching a period of dependence upon foreign uranium (which will be true). The history of the uranium market has been one of dramatic changes and overreaction to those changes. The rapid price rise of a few years ago generated excess U.S. production capacity and the rapid price drop of the last two years will almost certainly result in too little capacity. It will soon be difficult for U.S. buyers to buy domestic material except on the spot market. The question is, "will they care?" The lack of demand, of course, is the underlying reason for the current poor health of the uranium industry. In 1972, 1973 and 1974 collectively, there were 105 nuclear reactors ordered in the U.S. That ordering rate was expected to continue and accelerate throughout this century. In 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 altogether, there were 56 more reactors cancelled than ordered. The net growth of our only customer since 1974 has been a negative 56. TO put this in perspective, if these 56 reactors were operating now it would more than double present U.S. uranium consumption. Underlying lack of demand is something that is simply not going to change in this decade. Time is going to be required. The NRC indicates that the maximum feasible number of new reactors that can be licensed each year is six. That would increase uranium consumption by only 10% per year. New reactors, if ordered tomorrow, would not generate new uranium demand until after 1990. Even so, United States&apos; consumption of uranium will rise from the 1980 level of 18 million pounds per year, to

Jan 1, 1982

By Brian F. Osborne

A continuous on-line particle-size analysis system for solid/liquid suspensions is described. The basic sensor utilizes a centrifugal principle to separate particles according to size, the resultant separation being measured by means of beta-ray attenuation. Results obtained when analyzing a variety of materials at sizes from 65 mesh (210 µ) to 20 w are discussed in detail. Accuracies better than 2% are demonstrated. The effects of particle specific gravity, and mixtures of materials of diverse specific gravities, are discussed from both a practical and a theoretical viewpoint. It is demonstrated that particle specific gravity has a minimal effect on the size reading obtained. This renders the instrument suitable for handling materials where the ratio of light to heavy component may change. The design of the first commercial installation of this instrument is described in detail. This installation will be capable of analyzing three streams in sequence, measurement at three particle sizes being effected on each stream.

Jan 1, 1975

GENTLEMEN : It is my privilege to transmit herewith the reports for the calendar year 1932 of your Treasurer and the Chairmen of the following Standing Committees: Finance, Admissions, Membership, Papers and Publications, Library, and Mining and Metallurgy. To these reports you are referred for additional details of the year&apos;s activities. Finances.-Continuation of depressed conditions in the mining industry (in common with other industries) caused the income of the Institute to decline from $168,274 in 1931 to $138,331. However, economies were effected so as to reduce expenditures from $171,198 to $135,977. As a consequence the net result of the operations for the year was a-surplus of income amounting to $2,354 compared with a deficit of $2,924 in 1931. This gratifying result is accounted for in large measure by the foresight of the Finance Committee in anticipating a substantial decline in income and preparing the budget accordingly. Incidentally, the tentative budget for 1933 has been balanced at $125,000.

Jan 1, 1932

By AIME AIME

ALL 32 of the Local Sections of the Institute in the continental United States and practically all of the Divisions as well, had representatives present at the Conferences of Local Section and Division Delegates at the Annual Meeting. Three sessions were held, two on Monday and one on Thursday, both the incoming and outgoing Presidents of the Institute being on hand to con- duct the meetings. H. J. Brown was called to the chair during a portion of the last session, President Fulton having to leave early. Complete minutes of the meetings have ,been sent to all delegates. In general, the Local Sections appeared, from their reports, to have risen to the wartime demands made upon them with their usual resourcefulness. Apparently more difficulty has arisen in the last year in arranging attractive programs and securing acceptable speakers, this being perhaps attributable to the fact that most technical men have been extremely busy. Careful planning ahead .has usually brought good results, however. Another wartime difficulty has been the matter of transportation to meetings, gasoline rationing and congestion on the railroads and buses being a handicap to attendance. Sharing cars has proved practical as a method of meeting this issue, this again requiring planning. Suitable meeting places and a supply of food have been another difficulty for some local groups.

Jan 1, 1944

Alexander Forsyth, Southport, Me. (communication to the Secretary): In Mr. Irving&apos;s able and interesting paper he describes minutely the appearance of the wolframite and its association with the refractory siliceous gold-ore. He also describes this gold-ore, but fails to mention the important pockets of metallic gold found in the Lead City occurrence of it. I use the term " metallic " in preference to the more usual " free," for it has been found that this gold is not easily amalgamated. Metallic gold is comparatively rare in the refractory siliceous gold-ores of the Black Hills; hence its occurrence in considerable amounts in the Lead City wolframite district deserves notice. I possess a beautiful specimen from the Harrison mine. It is a lump of drusy, granular ore, about 6 in. in diameter. The gold .is " shot" through it in large and small pin-heads; and in two specially oxidized areas, each about 11/2 in. in diameter, it is peppered full. The famous " Grantz strike," made in the Lead City wolframite locality, produced many beautiful gold specimens. This district affords an excellent example of the repeated discovery of new mineral values upon old ground. By reason of its proximity to the Homestake vein, this wolframite deposit was inevitably traversed many times by experienced geologists, mineralogists and mining engineers, who evidently must have thrown aside, with no thought of wolframite, the lumps of " black iron " lying about. I have the admission of an able geologist that, six months before the wolframite was discovered, he visited some of the very mines where it occurred, and passed it by as magnetic iron-ore. At the time of the discovery, the mineral was scattered over the gold-mine dumps in no small quantities, having been culled as worthless out of the gold-ore. It remained for

Jan 1, 1902

In Mr. Weed&apos;s interesting paper, frequent reference is made to the Cananea copper-deposits, which are said to have been so vigorously exploited that they produced 14,000,000 Ib. of copper in 1901. The ore-bodies which yielded this large quantity of metal are described as a product of contact-metamorphism, and in Mr. Weed&apos;s genetic classification of such deposits, they receive a place under the sub-heading, "Deposits impregnating and replacing beds of contact-zone."* They are considered by Mr. Weed to represent a special type under this head, and are further classified as: " l. Chalcopyrite deposits: (a) Pyrrhotite ores; (6) Magnetite ores, Cananea type." In condensing much information into a comparatively small space, the presentation of a subject may be so abbreviated as to detract from its clearness. The situation at La Cananea, considering its importance from an economic as well as scientific standpoint, may he worthy of more detailed description. As Mr. Weed rightly remarks, " structural differences are so important, and have SO marked a bearing, not alone on the theory of their genesis, hut also on the working of the deposits and a determination of their value as mines, that they merit a full discussion."† It is my present purpose: (1) to show that it is doubtful whether the copper of La Cananea is mined, except to a limited

Jan 1, 1903

By Arnulf Muan, R. E. Johnson

Equilibrium CO2 /CO ratios of a gas phase coexisting with selected oxide phase assemblages of the system CaO-"Fe0"-SiOz and vnetallic iron have been determined at 1080°C. The data obtained are used to calculate activity-conzposition relations for metasili-cute, orthosilicate, and CaO- "FeO" solid solutions, and to determine a new value for the free energy of formation of C&S&0,. The metasilicate solution is practically ideal, whereas large deviations from ideality exist in the othe,r two solid solutions. BECAUSE of the geochemical and metallurgical importance of the oxides CaO, "FeO", and SiOz, the system CaO-"FeO"-SiO2 has been the subject of several experimental studies during the past 30 years. Following the delineation of phase relations at liquidus temperatures by a group of investigators at the Geophysical Laboratory of the Carnegie Institution of Washington in 1933,1 Chipman and associates in the early forties2,3 determined activities of FeO in liquids of this system. Since that time, many attempts have been made to interpret the data of Chipman et al. in terms of the constitution of the silicate liquids and the interaction parameters among the various constituents of the system (see for instance papers by Richardson4 and by Flood and coworkers5). One of the assumptions made in some of these interpretations4 is that the binary silicate systems CaSiO3-FeSiO3 and CazSi04-Fe2SiO4 mix ideally in the solid state. The objective of the present study is to provide experimental data on activity-com position relations in solid solutions of the system CaO-"FeO"-SiO2. Such data will contribute toward an understanding of the thermodynamics of silicate solid-solution phases in general, and will serve specifically to confirm or refute some of the assumptions made in interpreting liquid slag behavior. PREVIOUS WORK Phase relations in the system CaO-"FeO"-SiO2 in contact with metallic iron were determined by Bowen, Schairer, and Posnjak,1 and additional phase-equilibrium data for this system have been presented by Allen and snow.&apos; A reproduction of the most up-to-date phase diagram for this system is shown in Fig. 1.7&apos;8 Of particular interest in the present investigation are the relations among the various crystalline phases slightly below the lowest solidus temperature in the system, as shown in Fig. 2. The present work will be concerned primarily with some of the composition

Jan 1, 1968

R. W. Raymond, New York City: As was announced in the Secretary&apos;s note, appended to the pamphlet edition of Dr. Ledoux&apos;s paper, I have undertaken to superintend the preparation of the samples required by his plan, and the ollation for publication of the results reported. Promises of cordial co-operation hare been received already from a number of leading assayers;? and it is to he expected that the data thus collected, and the discussion to be based upon them, will shed much light upon the important question raised in this paper. Although a detailed discussion of methods on the present occasion might be deemed premature, I am sure that suggestions on the subject from members engaged in assaying would be timely and valuable as a preliminary to later and more detailed criticism. Herbert G. Torrey (U. S. Assay Office), New York City : I may say in relation to the losses in the furnace that I have made a number of experiments, and on my little blank form years ago I put down a place for the losses in the cupel. It met with a good deal of opposition among the smelters, but I claimed that it was my duty to give the full amount of the gold and silver present, and that it

Jan 1, 1895

By W. R. Jones

composition, he cannot reasonably asl; the manufacturer to guarantee that this composition shall give certain physical results. W. R. Jones, Pittsburgh, Pa. : The question that naturally occlun to me is this: Has Dr. Dudley in his inveatigtrtions been aiming to prove a theory, or has he been guided by an earnest desire to discover what are the proper elements in the composition of a good-wearing steel rail ? Unfortunately, for correct chemical information, he has omitted in his analgw two very importnat elements,—sulpbur and copper. Now, before we will even begin to admit the correctnets of Dr. Dudley&apos;s conclusions and the formula he prescribes, we will at the start question the propriety of any chenlist or scientist prescribing a formula for making steel when he has iguared such important ele ments as sulphur aud copper. I, for one, will not accept any such formula. Are we sure, or is Dr. Daclley sure, that the chemical analyseq embodied in his paper are correct? This may seem a presumptuous queetion, yet, with my experience with chenlists, I naturally doubt the correctness of the analyse8, and, before I will accept them as correct, I will ask that comparative tests of phosphorous and man ganese be made by the Pennsylvania Railroad chemists and the chemists of the leading steel-works in the country. Let us first verify the correctness of the analyses before we consider the con clusions. I can enumerate a great number of instances in which chemists have differed very widely in their determinations of phos phorus and manganese. A prominent iron fitam made a contract with the Edgar Thomson Steel Company to deliver pig metal guar anteed to be between 0.07 and 0.08 phosphorus; an analysis by our chemist resulted in phosphorus 0.148 and 0.152,—a rather startling difference! Again, a sample bar of steel, in which our chemist reported phosphorus 0.11, was tested by a chemist of au other Bessemer works, ana his determinations were phosphorus between 0.07 and 0.08: A leading engineering establishmeut of Pittsbdrgh bought iron claimed by a chemical analysis to contain 0.08 phosphorus; our Mr. Ford found phosphorus 0.145. A chem ist connected with an open-hearth works reported manganese in a piece of steel, 1.14; in a second determination from the same piece of steel, by the same chemist, manganese was reported 0.43. The chemist was kept in ignorauce of the fact that both samples were from the saw piece of steel. Two dctermiuations for manganese

Jan 1, 1881

By Anthony G. Reid

INTRODUCTION At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country&apos;s daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country&apos;s drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world&apos;s oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000". But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant in¬crease in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime&apos;s programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing&apos;s (China&apos;s premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country&apos;s ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would At the time of the death of Mao Tse-tung in 1976, China was a major oil producing country with a daily oil flow in the order of 1.735 million barrels. This position had been achieved with minimal assistance from the outside world. Further, only some fifteen years had elapsed since the country&apos;s daily oil production capacity had hovered at the barely significant level of one hundred thousand barrels. Why then did the new leaders of China, after this very creditable record of success, suddenly change the direction of the country&apos;s drive for future hydrocarbon production? First, by switching much of the emphasis of exploration from onshore to the offshore continental shelf basins, and further by apparently abandoning the philosophy of self reliance calling upon the world&apos;s oil industry to share in the task of locating and developing these potential offshore energy reserves. The answer is probably only partly understood by those of us outside China, However, a number of factors exerting an important influence on this decision can be identified. THE MOVE OFFSHORE The new leadership was anxious to rapidly move China into her rightful place amongst the powerful and technologically advanced nations of the world. Modernization became the slogan, specifically modernization on four fronts, agriculture, industry, technology and military with the goal to "catch the west by the year 2000", But how to generate the capital to finance this massive modernization program? The rapid escalation of the price of crude oil following the 1973 Oil Embargo and the continuing apparently insatiable world demand for this now extremely precious primary resource was very clear to all. China, as a major producer, could export crude to help finance the ambitious development programs of the government. To do this, however, would require a very significant increase in present production capacity, as the domestic demand even for China with her relatively low per capita energy consumption, is essentially equal to the current production. Trying to rapidly move the new regime&apos;s programs into actions, one can only assume that the planners looked at the success of the petroleum industry over the preceding fifteen years and quickly concluded that this well established curve could be maintained and indeed steepened with an increase in effort. The rapid discovery of a few more Daqing&apos;s (China&apos;s premier oil field, producing one million barrels a day) would have the country&apos;s ambitious modernization goals within reach. Petroleum would be the principal bridge to the bright future. The next decision involved the question of where to look for these vast new reserves. Chinese exploration teams had already looked at most of the onshore sedimentary basins and, while they were the first to admit that there was much yet to do, it was fairly clear to them that the potential for large new accumulations was confined to two areas: the little explored, remote, inhospitable regions of western China, principally Xinkiang Province and the equally unexplored offshore basins of the continental shelf and slope. In both cases China faced a very serious problem. The inhospitable environments were severely straining her petroleum industry&apos;s current technological ability to cope, particularly as the government needed rapid results. Thus the pragmatic and, to the foreign oil industry, unexpected decision to invite cooperation with the outside world. The reasons for the initial emphasis on the exploration of the offshore basins with the cooperation of foreign oil companies are again supposition on my part, but probably involved considerations of technical merit, ease of development and delivery to markets together with more sensitive issues such as controling the influence of foreign philosophies and values on the Chinese population by containing most foreign activity to the offshore. So within three years of the death of the great helmsman, China had developed a plan to involve foreign oil companies, both state and private, in a grand plan to rapidly increase the nations oil production. In fact, by this time, the first round of talks had been concluded and the first phase begun, and what a beginning. Some forty eight companies from thirteen countries had signed documents to participate formally in this world scale event. It was far easier to list those companies which did not participate than to list those which did. FOREIGN COMPANY INTEREST Why the rush by the world&apos;s oil industry to be involved in China? What was China offering which made everyone so anxious to join in? Again the answer is complex in detail, but principally involved a combination of factors which together caused this virtual stampede. Timing was a major element. Oil Companies, despite an ever increasing take by governments, were beginning to benefit. from the&apos; rapid escalation of crude prices induced by OPEC and were looking for suitable areas to reinvest these funds. Producers

Jan 1, 1982