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"The content of production reports has its origins in raw measurements taken in harsh production environments. The ensuing measurement/estimation errors always affect reproducibility such that, regardless of the fact that they are balanced through statistical data reconciliation, reported numbers are simply the most probable values of inferred probability distributions. This has important implications for how metal recoveries should be monitored and reported. Indeed, in a context where many process optimisation activities are based on small improvements in recovery, there should be no doubt that inadequate handling of measurement/estimation errors can easily exaggerate or mask actual changes in process performance. However, estimates of the reproducibility of reported metal recoveries are rarely reported to plant management. This situation persists despite the fact that a code compliant metal accounting system must inform management about business risks related to metal accounting. To this extent, this paper focuses on the continuous management of reproducibility level of metal recoveries in compliance with the best practices. Sensitivity analysis of primary and secondary metal accounting models is performed to show the resulting probability distributions for metal recoveries. Some guidelines are given for designing and managing metal accounting systems capable of achieving and sustaining predefined levels for the reproducibility of metal recoveries.INTRODUCTIONEach and every mineral processing plant produces daily, weekly and monthly production reports in which metal balances for payable and penalty elements are presented. While such production reports are usually consulted in offices, underlying raw measurements are taken in harsh production environments where mechanical vibrations, humidity, corrosion and dust, to name a few, disturb measurement procedures. It is thus no surprise that several authors (Francois-Bongarcon & Gy, 2002; Gaylard, Randolph, & Wortley, 2014; Holmes, 2010; Spangenberg & Minnitt, 2014) have reported pervasive issues related to mass/sampling measurements in the context of mineral processing."

Jan 1, 2016

Placer Dome Asia Pacific operates eight mines in the region and has two closed operations that are either under rehabilitation or at the latter stage of care, monitoring and maintenance. All operating mines are scheduled to close within the next ten years based on current proven reserves. Mine closure planning and associated risk assessments are integrated into both strategic planning and day-to-day operations within the Placer Dome group. Mine closure is all about predicting the potential risks and Placer DomeÆs knowledge has improved following the planned closure at Kidston Gold mine in North Queensland. Planning for closure commenced in earnest in 1994, and focused on identifying the issues and associated potential risk to the environment, and ensuring that the most suitable control measures were implemented leading up to and following closure in July 2001. At all times during the process of planning, implementation, safety contractor management and post closure, the identification of risk and potential threats to the business have been identified and managed. Post closure risk assessment of rehabilitation strategies potential to fail has been completed in conjunction with URS and opportunities to manage these potential failures in perpetuity will be discussed along with lease surrender. Misima Mines is currently processing low-grade ore and plans to close in 2004. Planning for closure has been ongoing for several years with a focus on the social aspects and the impact of the mine closing on a remote island community. Misima Mines has assessed the risk profiles using a community closure focus group, to identify both the biophysical and social aspects for closure.

Jan 1, 2003

A failure of the Pit IA highwall in July 1989 led Newcrest Mining Ltd's Telfer Gold Mine to commence underground operations approximately 12 months ahead of schedule. The failure presented four major challenges to management: 1. how to maximise the recovery of the Middle Vale Reef (MVR) in the open pit: 2. how to minimise the risk to personnel involved in the extraction of the remaining open pit ore; 3. how to avoid disruption to ore supply: and 4. how to maintain a permanent and safe means of accessing the underground operations from the base of the pit. The risks associated with meeting these challenges were minimised through the installation of a complex network of real time slope monitoring equipment. These monitors were connected to an alarm system which was combined with detailed operational procedures to be carried out in the event of a highwall alarm being triggered. The accuracy with which the risk of failure has been managed was demonstrated recently when the onset of a second failure was initially identified some 13 months prior to its ultimate collapse in October 1992. The location, timing and size of the failure was able to be predicted allowing appropriate precautionary measures to be taken to ensure safety of access to the underground portal and pumping equipment in the base of the pit. This paper reviews the sequence of events leading to both the July 1989 and October 1992 failures of the Pit 1A highwall and the monitoring equipment and procedures used to identify, quantify and manage the risk to personnel operating in the base of the pit.

Jan 1, 1994

By Chris Twigge

The paper point out development and successful commercial introduction of new technologies into a metalurgicall. The discussion that follows examines the overall issues of implementation from a management perspectiva and will highlight areas where key success factors are often overlooked. The framework presented is structured around the following key themes: The prime incentive for introducing new technologies is broadly one of economics, the implementation of new technologies is, to a large degree, a process of risk management and although the implementation of new technologies revolves around technical and economic issues, in the end the decisiva factor is people. Proper recognition of the human factors is critical to success. In this sense, the above principles are discussed in the sections that follow and include a number of examples to illustrate how technology can be successfully implementad and how it can fail.

Oct 6, 1999

By Akira Fujisaki

"The oil crisis accelerated the change of non-ferrous metals' demand structure. Maturing societies in developed countries and preference for lighter, thinner and smaller products are eroding the non-ferrous metal industries' growth potential. Inventory-control, stockpiling and developing new demand are measures Japanese smelters have taken to cope with the changing demand.The most effective means for risk management of product demand lies in the cooperation between ore producing countries and metal consuming developed countries to assist developing countries in their efforts to ""take-off"", which in turn will bring about a surge of demand for metals.SummaryThe non-ferrous metal industry in the world is suffering its most serious slump since the war. With some of the markets of the advanced industrialized countries approaching saturation point and economized usage of natural resources and substitution growing, the possibility of a quick recovery of the demand for base metals is dim.To cope with the changing product demand Japanese producers have had recourse to such measures as strict inventory control and stockpiling for the purpose of stabilized imports. They have also tried hard for securing raw materials and promoting new field s of demand but the very core of ""risk management"" has been the diversification of line s of business to bolster and stabilize the foundation of management of the non-ferrous metal industry in Japan.To see the demand for nori-ferrous metals recover from the slump and be put on a path of solid development, we have to wait for the economies of the developing countries to ""take off"" and for its realization the economies of the developed countries must be reactivated with new growth industries playing a leading role, and the transfer of technology and money recycling must be carried out smoothly under an orderly international trade system."

Jan 1, 1983

This paper sets out a number of means by which professionals can reduce or eliminate the risk of professional liability whether as directors, employees, partners, independent consultants or contractors. A relationship between client and professional is commonly cited as an example of a fiduciary relationship: the professional "undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the interests of' the client "in the exercise of a power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or practical sense."2 As a fiduciary, a professional must ensure that his or her exercise of power does not result in a position of ascendancy or undue influence over the client. Also, a professional must avoid situations where there is scope for even the perception of potential conflict between his or her professional duty to the client and his or her own Interest.

Jan 1, 1995

It is self evident that in many cases mining disrupts communities, however, community reaction to mining varies enormously. This is due to a whole host of factors, some physical, some financial, some political and some a direct result of the projected mining company attitude towards the community at large. Physical and political factors are increasingly being dealt with realistically and financial aspects are to a significant extent determined by profit margins. If the acceptable profit margin canÆt accommodate all necessary costs (which now includes a variety of community considerations unheard of even a decade ago), then the project is just not viable. Despite major commitments now made by many mining companies to their affected communities, corporate attitudes, and their projection, remain as the most outstanding factor in mining project development where real gains can still be made in effectively reducing social risk. This paper addresses both international and domestic experience gained in managing this aspect of mining development risk, including initiatives implemented by multilateral institutions.

Jan 1, 2003

Project evaluation is completed through individual studies covering technical and financial aspects of the mine to market. These studies are completed at various levels of detail depending on where the project evaluation is in the projectÆs life cycle. The competency of the studies varies in relation to the quality of data, level of the skills employed, control, management and reporting structure. The focus of this paper is managing elements of the study, looking at the cost of opportunity to influence the project, against the value added. Selection of the study manager and study teams is central to getting an integrated project evaluation addressing the correct issues completed on time. Retention of key personnel can reduce rework which, in turn, can reduce time and cost impacts. It is important to have a work breakdown structure at the outset so that the study teams have a common numbering and naming system that will integrate areas, equipment, budgets estimates and accounts. Having set up the evaluation groups and provided training in the study procedures, understanding the scope and schedule are vital elements in producing a project evaluation that addresses the opportunities and the risks of the final project. Arriving at an accurate capital budget requires integration of the research controlled through common systems. Project evaluation process must also address how the project is to be delivered.

Jan 1, 2007

Project evaluation is completed through individual studies covering technical and financial aspects of the mine to market. These studies are completed at various levels of detail depending on where the project evaluation is in the project's life cycle. The competency of the studies varies in relation to the quality of data, level of the skills employed, control, management and reporting structure. The focus of this paper is managing elements of the study, looking at the cost of opportunity to influence the project, against the value added. Selection of the study manager and study teams is central to getting an integrated project evaluation addressing the correct issues completed on time. Retention of key personnel can reduce rework which, in turn, can reduce time and cost impacts. It is important to have a work breakdown structure at the outset so that the study teams have a common numbering and naming system that will integrate areas, equipment, budgets estimates and accounts. Having set up the evaluation groups and provided training in the study procedures, understanding the scope and schedule are vital elements in producing a project evaluation that addresses the opportunities and the risks of the final project. Arriving at an accurate capital budget requires integration of the research controlled through common systems. Project evaluation process must also address how the project is to be delivered.

Jan 1, 2007

By J. P. Gous, J. J. Sutherland

"Transalloys is a silicomanganese (SiMn) producer located in South Africa, and uses only local manganese ores to produce SiMn alloy. The plant operates five open submerged arc furnaces (SAFs) with an annual capacity of 180 000 t of saleable SiMn.Maintaining tap-holes is critical for effective furnace operation, allowing proper drainage of the furnace with minimal operator interference. Using a claygun and drill arrangement installed at each furnace, tapping occurs every four hours. Tap-holes are maintained through mickey replacement and brick repairs. Three furnaces have SiC tap-holes and two have graphite tap-holes.This paper gives a review of SAF operation, furnace and tap-hole design, daily tapping operation, and maintenance practices for repairing tap-holes.IntroductionDefining tap-hole life cycle, Steenkamp et al., (2016) highlighted four main steps: installation during furnace relines, day-to-day operations, tap-hole maintenance, and tap-hole repair. The authors argued that the design of the tap-hole area should allow for all four stages in the tap-hole life-cycle. Design principles for each stage were presented using silicomanganese (SiMn) production as a case study. Here we present a further analysis of the case study by providing practical examples of how the tap-hole life-cycle is managed at Transalloys during the design, operation, and maintenance of submerged arc furnaces (SAFs) applied in the production of SiMn.BackgroundTransalloys is the largest producer of SiMn in Africa. Its smelter complex is based outside the town of eMalahleni, in the Mpumalanga Province of South Africa. Transalloys was commissioned in the mid- 1960s as a high- and low-carbon ferrochromium plant based on the Perrin process. In 1967 the plant was converted to SiMn production because of constraints in the ferrochrome market (Basson, Curr, and Gericke, 2007; Bezemer, 1995). Today, the installed production capacity is 180 000 t of SiMn annually. Plant operations consists of five SAFs (see ratings in Table I), operating 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (including maintenance), involving 280 permanent employees, with up to 120 contract employees on site at any given time."

Jun 1, 2019

The transition from exploration to feasibility is a stage in the development of mineral resource projects that is frequently not handled well. The transition marks a point in the project development process where resource evaluation priorities change significantly from the discovery of mineralisation and the rapid assessment of the potential tenor of the mineralised system, to the detailed assessment of the deposit.   Information used in the exploration process tends to be of a qualitative or theoretical nature initially, but gradually becomes more quantitative in character as geological knowledge relating to individual prospects grows.   The transition from discovery and rapid exploration of a new deposit occurs at a relatively early stage in project development, coinciding with the first attempt to prepare a resource estimate for the deposit. Fundamental assumptions regarding both structural and grade continuity and uncertainty inherent in existing information need to be made so that they themselves may be addressed during the collection of additional data.   The effective commencement of feasibility studies involve the introduction of new accountabilities either as a result of appointment of a project manager, and through needing to be able to quantify: ò     the quality of data being collected for resource evaluation purposes; ò     confidence associated with resource estimates; and ò     the need to develop an audit trail for the project, required to make the resource evaluation decision-making process as transparent as possible.   Quality assurance is a concept to which exploration geologists have frequently had little exposure. Being able to demonstrate the quality of data used in feasibility studies is, however, a crucial component of the overall risk management and reduction.   Development of a transparent audit trail for data assists in demonstrating the quality of data which is frequently perceived to translate directly to confidence inherent in resource estimates.   Establishing procedures for geological data collection and management also provides a more reliable framework for making decisions that impact on project execution, again resulting in improved confidence in resource estimates and associated geoscientific data.   Regular, independent technical audits, in principle similar to audits conducted for the ongoing certification of standards compliant quality assurance systems, are a major, positive factor in effective project management and execution.   Information used in project evaluation, feasibility and development must be based on facts. Facts are effectively observations that are ideally made systematically, recorded in a systematic manner, and by being collected effectively are not subject to change.   Effectively managing the transition from exploration to resource evaluation, feasibility and project development involves recognising the nature of changes in the nature, detail and scope of geoscientific data required at each stage of project development. In doing so it is essential to: ò     recognise when the change occurs (as early as preparation of the initial resource estimate for a project); ò     accept that the change may not be gradual; and, ò     ensure that the project evaluation team is adequately resourced.   These objectives require recognition of the value of previous experience and the need to instill a true team approach amongst both staff and contractors associated with the project. Regular formal and informal communications between staff, contractors and other stakeholders in the project are an essential tool in ensuring personnel are aware of factors affecting their role in the project.

Jan 1, 2004

The transition from low stress to high stress conditions is a challenge eventually faced by most mines in Australia that extend to depths greater than (generally) about 1000 m. In areas with strongly adverse 'stress versus depth' gradients, such as some parts of Western Australia, significant stress-related problems have occurred at depths as shallow as 300 m below surface. The actual depth at which the 'transition' occurs is a function of the local pre-mining stress field, the strengths of the various rock types hosting the deposit and the layout and sequencing adopted in the mine. Stress-related damage can result in increased support costs, and delays associated with rehabilitation and disruption to production. In the worst case, where strong seismicity and associated damage occurs in active mining areas, 'exclusion' zones and 're-entry' protocols may be required. These can severely disrupt production. A key aspect of managing the transition is the recognition of the onset of stress-related ground behaviour. Damage mapping can be used to develop understanding of the relationships between mining activities and the local and regional response to them. Carefully documented case histories provide a basis for calibrating numerical models. This paper discusses some of the typical styles of ground behaviour observed in higher stress conditions in underground mines. A simple damage classification scheme is described to assist in 'damage mapping' of mine tunnels. An example of damage mapping is presented to illustrate an approach commonly used for recording stress-related damage.

Nov 25, 2010

By David C. Russell

The Department of the Interior used to be a quiet, noncontroversial, almost boring agency. It, after all is the fifth oldest of the Departments, and as an old line Federal agency it has studiously performed its preservation and resource management functions in a caretaker mode--though some would say more "undertaker" than "caretaker"--locking up the body and soul of America piece-by-piece. Yes, quiet, serene. That is until Jim Watt showed up. And we have all seen that version of Mt. Vesuvius which resulted--only it was the environmentalists who blew their tops. Ronald Reagan chose Jim Watt as Secretary of this fine old agency to prove that one-third of our Nation's land and over a billion acres on the Outer Continental Shelf can work for this Nation. At the foundation of President Reagan's charge to Secretary Watt is a belief in the tenets of the free enterprise system, and in the individual freedoms upon which this country was founded. There are those who don't share this belief in democracy and free enterprise, and those who believe this 205 year experiment called the United States of America will fail. Nikita Krushchev said "we will bury you"--obviously he didn't agree with our system. An Italian sociologist, Franco Ferrorotti, said bureaucratic stagnation will kill capitalism. Certainly we have all felt the ravages of bloated bureaucracies. Perhaps one indicator in the United States is the Federal Register, that daily compilation of Government's largesse. In 1970, 20,000 pages of the Federal Register were published. A decade later, in 1980, that volume had quadrupled to 80,000 pages. The Federal bureaucracy can stagnate from excessive budgets as well. The Interior Department spent $60 million on administering Federal coal leasing in 1981. That's nearly two bits a ton for every ton of coal leased in 1981. You wouldn't stay in business very long if your administrative overhead on inventory was that outrageous. But the pessimism of our critics is apparent from more than red tape and bloated budgets. For decades America has been fasting--consuming too little of America's wealth of minerals, subsisting instead on a diet heavily reliant upon mid-east oil, with little emphasis or concern for inventorying and developing domestic energy and mineral resources. Economics--yes. But short-term, short-sighted economics. Excessively dependent upon foreign imports, of oil, cobalt, chrome and other strategic minerals, the U.S. measures its time before another embargo--or fallen Shah, or Soviet manipulation, or Saudi shift, or, as we witnessed in Egypt, assassination--an untimely loss to mankind and efforts to bring peace to the troubled mid-east. These disruptions, in addition to their tragic human tolls, impair the free world's security. Huge chunks of the United States have been locked away in dozens of single land use categories in the name of conservation, with only the foggiest idea of what resources might be denied the American people-and this at a time of unacceptable levels of energy and strategic mineral imports. More than half and perhaps two-thirds of all Government-owned lands are totally withdrawn from or severely restricted to development under the mining and leasing laws. We must continue to rid Government of the overly zealous restraints which have been keeping us from drawing upon that which can help restore our economy and national security. When we assumed responsibility, the United States was dependent on foreign sources for about 40 percent of its oil. In 1981, our oil import bill was approximately $83 billion--nearly 17 times what it was in 1972. Our reliance on foreign sources for essential minerals is even more disturbing. We must look to other countries--some unfriendly, some unstable--for 22 of 36 strategically critical minerals. Yet the energy resources on federal lands which are owned by the American people could meet our needs for centuries if properly managed. Eighty-five percent of the crude oil yet to be discovered in America is likely to come from public lands, as will 40 percent of the natural gas, 35 percent of the coal, 80 percent of the oil shale, nearly all of the tar sands, and substantial portions of uranium and geothermal energy. Our vast hardrock-mineral wealth includes untapped deposits of essential elements we now import, such as chromium, copper, platinum, and cobalt. The obvious question is, if these abundant resources can help to revitalize our economic strength and to preserve our national security, why aren't we using them to better advantage? To a large extent, the answer can be found in past decisions to restrict public access to the federal estate, thus deferring to us or our successors the tough decisions that flow from Congress' mandate to provide for environmentally responsible development of America's energy and mineral treasures. Here is the legacy this Administration inherited: In January 1981, 7 years after the onset of the Mideast oil embargo: ---Less than 15 percent of federal onshore lands were under lease for oil and gas development; ---No oil and gas leases had been issued in Alaska for 15 years;

Jan 1, 1982

By R Hao

Uncertainties in large open pit geotechnical modelling has been a major concern for slope stability analysis. The level of confidence in the in-put assumptions, such as structural and rock mass model, dictates the modelling results to some extent. This article is to detail a case study of Kalgoorlie Consolidated Gold Mines (KCGM) regarding a predicted inter-ramp failure on an as-built pit walls by a 3D numerical modelling. Significant concerns were raised across site and multiple preventive plans were considered. After intense data collection work, it was confirmed that the risk of failure had been overestimated. The case study has improved the understanding of geotechnical data in-put and has enhanced the process of creating and updating geotechnical structural models at KCGM.

Jun 22, 2022

By G M. Jones, J Rademan

Debswana, owned by the Government of the Republic of Botswana (GRB) and De Beers in a 50:50 joint venture partnership, operates the Jwaneng diamond mine in Botswana - the most valuable diamond mine in the world. The mine provides between 60 - 70 per cent of DebswanaÆs earnings, and about 30 - 40 per cent of the GRBÆs income. In 2008, the company embarked on the Cut 8 Project - an open pit waste cut-back to expose more diamond bearing ore to sustain mine life by another six to seven years. This undertaking was much larger than previous cut-backs; it increased the waste stripping ratio threefold, increasing significantly the waste handling fleet of trucks, shovels and infrastructure, and impacted a large part of the materials handling plant which required replacement with new facilities. The project coincided with the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and a slowdown in the economy. Its $4 billion total life cost was billed as æthe largest private investment project in BotswanaÆ which produced heightened expectations amongst stakeholders that it would redress some of the issues brought about by the GFC and leave behind a legacy of jobs, increased opportunities for citizen owned business and improved social infrastructure.Most of the big project challenges were non-technical and ranged from dealing with various stakeholders?at?all levels, a 25 per cent currency depreciation of the Botswana Pula against the South African Rand, obtaining work permits for non-citizens in a job starved environment, managing construction to world class safety standards, managing the low productivity of construction workers and producing a viable legacy program that satisfied the GRB and stakeholders. Whilst most of these risks were identified in front end studies, the magnitudes were in many instances underestimated. Managing this uncertainty on Cut 8 can provide valuable lessons to other projects in a similar environment, or at least provide the information to indicate that these factors should be adequately provided for in the financial evaluation of a project in the form of budget, schedule, contingency or risk mitigation.CITATION:Jones, G M and J Rademan, 2012. Reliability of expert judgements and uncertainty assessments, in Proceedings Project Evaluation 2012 , pp 109-116 (The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy: Melbourne).

May 24, 2012

By J. Wayne Erickson

One of the major problems facing today's mining industry is how to manage people and control costs in the underground mine. It is a problem with a solution. Because of the concerted effort to find and mine minerals near the surface, open-pit mine opportunities for certain minerals are becoming more limited; the mining industry will eventually be forced to produce more and more from underground mines in order to obtain those resources necessary to sustain our civilization. Although much technical progress has been made towards solving problems associated with the underground mine, such as - mine design, ventilation, rock support, equipment, and blasting techniques, little has been written on managing mining personnel. Much of what is being taught and practiced today about human relations, motivation, incentives, etc., applies to the underground miner, but the uniqueness of his group dictates a different treatment from that associated with the typical construction worker or factory employee. The difference lies with the kind of man attracted to underground mining and his working environment. Anyone who has had the responsibility of managing an underground mine would agree it is a unique problem.

Jan 9, 1976

By L N. Loganathan

Risk exposure in tunnel projects is extremely high due to various factors such as variability of subsurface conditions, selection of inappropriate design and tunnelling methods, improper risk assessment on adjacent surface and subsurface structures and utilities, and inadequate contractual practices. The risks in tunnelling must be borne by the contractor, designer and the owner of a tunnelling project. There have been a number of improvements in the last ten to 15 years in the manner in which tunnel projects are developed and implemented in terms of their design, construction, financing and operations. One significant improvement has been the manner in which underground conditions and their risks are being managed. Owners are less willing to transfer the full responsibility to the contractor for managing the underground conditions, although this is a familiar manner in which underground major urban projects have been previously contracted and managed. The owners of tunnel projects in Singapore have advanced the risk management process for their projects through geotechnical interpretative baseline reports (GIBRs), geotechnical data reports (GDRs) and project specifications (PSs). This paper discusses industry practice and its development as well as the application during the preparation and use in Singapore on the Deep Tunnel Sewerage System (DTSS) and the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE) project in Singapore. The DTSS trunk sewer is 48 km and ranges from 3.3 m to 6 m finished diameter up to 50 m below the ground. The underground conditions ranged from Old Alluvium, strengths of about 1 MPa to competent Bukit Tima granite, with strengths of over 230 MPa. The total route length of the MCE is about 5 km. About 3.6 km will be constructed underground, consisting of dual five-lane carriageways. The underground construction will be cut-and-cover, and 2.6 km will be constructed about 13 m underground, and 1 km of tunnel will range from 13 m to 24 m as the tunnel passes under a 420 m wide reach of Marina Bay, whose crossing will be constructed as a two-phase cofferdam.

Jan 1, 2008

By Ronald D. Mariani, Gregory E. Mahoski

BACKGROUND The steel and iron ore industry has had a long history of an adversarial relationship with its union and workforce. The Empire Mine during its first 40 years of existence was no exception. The "we-they" mentality went hand-in-hand with the normal by-product of an adversarial relationship, grievances and arbitration. This relationship was considered the norm and it was not until the late 1970s that consideration was given to changing this relationship. At this time the industry was involved in a fight for existence and the economic pressure demanded increasing productivity to lower cost. The challenge to survive highlighted the fact that an adversarial relationship was not conducive to attaining the needed gains in productivity. The first formal attempt to change the way we worked came in the 1980 Labor Agreement which provided for the opportunity to utilize Labor Management Participation Teams (LMPTs). LMPTs were established at the Empire Mine and they functioned for a couple of years. The teams spent most of their time working on creature-comfort issues and steered clear of dealing with productivity issues. Mine shutdowns had occurred in Michigan resulting in large layoffs, and the union was trying to add jobs and was not supporting teams that could increase productivity and eliminate jobs. When the 1986 labor negotiations began, the local union pulled their support of the LMPT process. Other initiatives were negotiated over the years to foster a change in the culture but, as with the LMPT program, they did not produce the desired culture change. It became abundantly clear: you cannot negotiate a culture change.

Jan 1, 2004

By B. T. Dawson

In today's work world, constant changes are a fact of life. Downsizing and technological advances are two of the most prominent concerns for employers and employees alike. In this article, the author addresses some of the emotional consequences of these changes and offers a new, empowering perspective for coping with them.

Jan 1, 1998

By W. J. Weymark

"The Gregg River project is located 40 kilometres southwest of Hinton, Alberta, adjacent to and east of Jasper National Park. This metallurgical coal mine has been developed as a joint venture between Gregg River Coal Ltd. (a subsidiary company of Mana/ta Coal Ltd.) and seven Japanese companies. This 200-million dollar project consists of a conventional truckshovel open-pit operation and a coal preparation plant rated at 2.14 million tonnes of clean coal per year. Mining operations started in October 1982 with plant start-up following in April 1983. Introduction This paper is an overview and update of the Gregg River project, a metallurgical coal mine being developed as a joint venture between Gregg River Coal Ltd. (a subsidiary of Manalta Coal Ltd.) and seven Japanese companies. The Gregg River Coal leases cover 3440 hectares and are located 40 kilometres south of Hinton, Alberta, adjacent to and north of Cardinal River Coal Mine (Fig. 1). This 200-million dollar project consists of a conventional truck-shovel operation and a coal preparation plant rated at 2.14 million tonnes of clean coal per year. A total of 31.5 million tonnes of clean metallurgical coal will be sold to the Japanese over a fifteen-year term. At present, mining operations are ahead of schedule and the plant started up on schedule in April 1983. Access and Climate An all-weather road, Highway 40, connects the minesite with Hinton (the nearest commercial centre) and a Canadian National Railway (C.N.R.) spur line connects the minesite with the C.N.R. main line in Edson. Hinton is accessible by road chartered airline and rail. ' ~h~ rug~ed and varied topography in the area creates large vanations m temperature and precipitation over short distances. The region is characterized by precipitation throughout the year long cold winters and short cool summers. The mean temperatur~ of the area range from a low of -14°C in January, the coldest month, to a high of 12°C in July, the warmest month. Long-term precipitation data indicates a mean yearly precipitation of 870 mm of which 620Jo occurs during the summer months."

Jan 1, 1985