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The subject of government involvement in industry is, to say the least, a touchy one. For many it conjures up thoughts of socialisation or nationalisation. For others it is a desirable objective and is seen as a means of social reform by giving government a greater say in the control and distribution of human, financial and natural resources for the betterment of the community. Whatever your point of view, it is difficult to deny that government involvement exists to lesser or greater degrees in all industries. The mining industry is no exception and the degree of government involvement is probably greater than it is in other industries. I think it is important to remember when talking about government involvement in industry to recognise that there are different types of involvement and that all governments have a right, if they so desire, to become involved in whatever way they choose. The decision of a government to increase its direct or indirect involvement must, of course, be taken in the national interest. Governments, if we are still old fashioned enough to believe in ministerial and electoral responsibility, must make up their own minds about whether their actions are in the national interest and they must be prepared to accept the consequences of that action, good or bad. For instance, they must decide

Jan 1, 1975

"Lax, misguided, and dangerous" is Rep. James Santini's description of the official US position on strategic nonfuel minerals. Santini (D-NV), chairman of the House Mines and Mining Subcommittee, criticized the Interior Department for "its long record of benign neglect" regarding the domestic minerals crisis. Santini made his remarks at a news conference at the American Mining Congress convention in San Francisco, where he released his subcommittee report "US Minerals Vulnerability: National Policy Implications." The report-said to be the first major congressional study of the minerals issue by a committee of jurisdiction is the result of a two-year inquiry. The investigation was undertaken, according to the chairman, "because no person or agency in the executive branch of government fully grasps the critical importance of nonfuel minerals to the nation's economy, defense, and quality of life." The report also urges a larger role for the Department of Defense, which has "stood passively by for many years as a consuming by-stander," according to the report. President Carter's incomplete Non-fuel Minerals Policy Review also drew the committee's ire; Santini calls it "a tragic waste that cost tax-payers $3.5 million and the loss of some 13,000 person-days." The subcommittee examined the following issues for its report: • The US minerals industry's inability to meet national raw material needs under a "hodgepodge of contradictory, restrictive, and irrational" federal regulations; • Dependency on foreign sources of strategic minerals in times of "increasing resource nationalism" and "Soviet mineral expansionism;" • National security needs for foreign mineral resources that do not have effective substitutes; • The US government's approach to national minerals policy "amid a growing realization that such a policy does not exist." The subcommittee report includes an analysis of public and private studies on nonfuel minerals and discusses a series of policy problem areas that negatively affect domestic production. Capital formation disincentives, tax policies, antitrust enforcement, environmental laws, health and safety regulations, technical problems, and restricted access to federally-controlled public lands contribute to what Santini calls a "tragic irony." "The irony is that we are a nation vastly rich in mineral resources yet our own government chooses to stifle development of these critical raw materials and thereby increase offshore reliance. The tragedy is that we also are ensuring US vulnerability to severe economic dislocations and a weakening of our national security." In just six years, from 1973-1978, the US trade deficit in nonfuel minerals rose from $2 billion per year to $8 billion, according to the report. The country imports more than 50% of 23 critical minerals, including 100% of its manganese, chromium, cobalt and platinum. The US is promoting its dependence on foreign mineral sources at the very time the security of many of those sources is becoming less certain, the report notes. Santini said the subcommittee investigation revealed a vulnerability that may be more serious and pervasive than that of foreign oil. The US may be able to develop alternate energy resources, but there are no effective substitutes for many nonfuel minerals. The report also discloses that US stockpiles of critical and strategic minerals are of inadequate supply and quality. Holdings of some vital minerals are far below present objectives, and for some there are no holdings at all, according to Santini. To resolve the current crisis, the report makes the following recommendations: • Complete immediately President Carter's Interagency Nonfuel Minerals Policy Review; • Implement (throught the Interior Department) the 1970 Mining and Minerals Policy Act; • Create an Office of Energy and Minerals with the same stature, power, and oversight responsibilities as the Council on Environmental Quality; • Ease federal restrictions on mineral exploration and development on public lands and implement a complete review of public land use policies; •Fund for and fulfill US nonfuel minerals stockpiling objectives; •Increase federal funding for non-

Jan 11, 1980

Important chemical and other technical engineering work necessary, for the prosecution of this war is being carried on by the Bureau of Mines Experiment Station, at Washington, D. C. The services of trained men of the following classifications are urgently needed Bacteriologists Instrument makers Biologists Laboratory Assistants Chemists, Inorganic Laborers Chemists, Organic Machinists Chemists, Physical Physiologists Chemists, Electro- Plumbers Chemical Engineers Steamfitters Draftsmen Stenographers. Electrical Engineers Skilled labor of various kinds If your training fits you for any of these occupations, send to the Bureau of Mines, American University Experiment Station, . Washington, D. C. for blank forms. When properly executed and returned by you, these forms will be placed on file, and when a vacancy occurs you will be considered for it and will be notified if your services are desired. If you are a registrant in the draft, and have not yet been- ordered to camp, it may be possible to have you immediately inducted into the service for work here. If you are not in the draft, but feel that you wish to serve your country in the present crisis, you can enlist, or serve as a civilian. Serve your country where you can serve it best. VAN H. MANNING, Director.

Jan 6, 1918

By Richard L. Gordon

Minerals long have been important commodities in international trade. As an inevitable result, the governments of the world have employed a wide variety of programs that affect the flow of trade. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish between the desire of more developed countries (MDCs) like the United States, western Europe, and Japan to control imports of minerals and the concern of less developed countries (LDCs), like India, about exploiting and exporting their minerals. The terminology used to describe different countries and the classification of specific countries into groups is unsettled and often changing. The poorest countries have been characterized as backward, undeveloped, underdeveloped, and developing. The problem seems to be in selecting a term that is both accurate and polite. Less developed seems, for reasons outlined by Hagen [pp. 51-57], the most convenient term. The borderline between an LDC and an MDC is always open to dispute. Objective measures are difficult to develop because of deficiencies in basic data, and enormous conceptual problems arise in making valid comparisons from even good data [see Hagen, pp. 7-28]. Thus, policies of the MDCs can be evaluated chiefly by using a few basic arguments for protectionist attitudes towards international trade. In dealing with the LDCs, a more far-ranging evaluation that covers general economic policy goals, the role of foreign investment, and the indirect effects of trade is required. This duality breaks down when trying to deal with the depressed areas in an MDC; here the issues are more akin to those associated with problems in an LDC. Similarly, variants of arguments used in LDCs appear in debates about foreign investments in MDCs. The whole discussion of minerals in LDCs, moreover, has obvious implications for MDCs like Canada and Australia. They, too, must face problems about the best utilization of their resources. THE RESTRICTION OF MINERAL TRADE BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES[a] At least to some extent, the world's leading industrial nations have intervened to control the inflow of minerals. Such regulation is particularly pronounced for energy. Both the United States and western Europe employ

Jan 1, 1976

By Thomas V. Falkie

Of the various critics of federal energy and minerals policy we are hearing these days--and they are legion--few make their points more vividly than our fellow SME member and eloquent spokesman for the mineral industry. Mr. Eugene Guccione. In a moment of comparative mellowness. Mr. Guccione recently characterized Washington's time-honored legislative and bureaucratic machinery as a case of "...scientific illiterates asking the incompetents to do the unnecessary." I hope the prevailing industry view of government is not quite that harsh, and yet one cannot deny that government intervention is indeed pressing in on the mineral industry with increasing force. What is happening today in Washington and in state capitols will have enormous impact--both short and long term--on the future of coal and mineral production in the United States. Symptoms of this trend are everywhere. In the first place, there is a sentiment, widely held and still spreading, that the government must become involved-- that no matter what the problem, the solution lies in more government intervention. Free enterprise versus statist, reflex reaction organizations. When it cones to regulation in the resource field, there is too often a tendency to start out by assuming guilt on the part of the mineral industry. This can lead to laws governing mineral recovery that are more punitive than constructive...laws drawn up with little research into the scientific or economic considerations involved.

Jan 1, 1975

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

Some aspects of the policies developed by Saskatchewan with respect to the provincial potash industry are discussed. The provincial potash policy was developed initially to deal with problems associated with an excess supply and consisted of output restrictions and floor prices. Changing market conditions led to a situation of rapidly increasing prices and revenues for the potash producers, and the nature of the policy problem switched from one of stabilizing the industry to one of levying increased taxes to enable the government to capture a portion of the revenues. The first part of the paper explains why a provincial potash policy was developed, the problems it attempted to deal with and how. The second part is an attempt to examine, from a public policy point of view, the impact of these policies on the potash industry.

Jan 1, 1977

By Arne Paus-Jenssen

The potash industry in Saskatchewan has recently been the focus of much new legislation at the provincial level and, along with other mining industries in Canada, also subject to changes in tax legislation at the federal level. As a result, the industry presently operates under (a) provincial production controls, a prorationing scheme; (b) a new provincial reserve tax on potash only and; (c) a new federal income tax applicable to all mineral industries. The prorating scheme dates back to 1970 and emerged as public policy because of the excess supply situation faced by the international potash industry towards the end of the sixties. This caused special problems for new mines in Saskatchewan and the provincial government decided to intervene. The new tax legislation at provincial and federal levels, both introduced within the last four years, reflects a belief that insufficient revenues accrue to the public sector from natural resources. All mining industries in Canada, including the potash industry, have had their tax positions completely reversed during these four years. Traditionally the mining sector in Canada has been a recipient of substantial tax incentives and has enjoyed low tax rates. This has changed and the mining sector is now one of the most heavily taxed sectors in the economy. In addition, the mining sector has moved from a situation where its rapid development was favoured by governments to a situation where this is no longer the case.

Jan 1, 1976

By Edmund E. Getzin

Of all the developments in the post-war history of Western Europe, none has been more remarkable in its aims and in the progress it has achieved than the movement toward European integration. It is not an exaggeration to say that this movement marks a virtual revolution, an about-face, in the long and complicated history of European states over the past three centuries. Although sporadic efforts to achieve European integration can be traced back for at least a 100 years, it remained for the breakdown of the European economies as a result of World War II and the subsequent Russian threat to give new impetus to the concept of broader economic and political integration. In fact, the economic integration of Europe following the end of the war was considered so essential that, in 1949, the administrator of the European Cooperation Administration, Paul Hoffman, spoke of the economic integration of Western Europe as an objective of American policy embodied in the Marshall Plan.

Jan 6, 1963

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration for potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief pre¬liminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliffside near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By G. R. Mansfield

THE third year of Government exploration f or potash by the U. S. Geological Survey and-the U. S. Bureau of Mines under the authorization of the act approved June 25, 1926 (Public 424-69th Cong.) is drawing to a close. The results thus far obtained are thought to be sufficiently interesting and satisfactory to justify the presentation of a brief preliminary account of the work. REVIEW OF EARLIER EXPLORATION The general geologic similarity of the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico to the potash field of Germany had long ago suggested the possibility of the presence of potash salts somewhere in that basin, but petroleum exploration was then making little headway there and the necessary data could not be obtained. The discovery by Udden in 1912 of potash in brine from the Spur well in Dickens County, Texas, was the first direct evidence of its presence. In 1915-17 the U. S. Geological Survey drilled a test well with standard tools at Cliff side near Amarillo, but failed to find potash. Nevertheless, an observer has been kept in the field, at first in cooperation with the Texas Bureau of Economic Geology but since 1922 by the Survey alone, to `secure data and samples from oil and gas tests. Since the discovery of oil in Reagan County in 1923 exploration by drilling has been rapidly extended to many parts of western Texas and southeastern New Mexico. The identification of the potash-bearing mineral polyhalite was first announced by the Geological Survey in June, 1921, the material having come from cuttings from the Bryant well in Midland County and the Burns well in Dawson County, Texas. Successive discoveries and announcements of similar purport aroused widespread interest in potash exploration, which culminated in the action by Congress already noted.

Jan 1, 1929

By P. V. Roundy

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934,' it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been defi-nitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not he done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unem-ployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration.

Jan 1, 1937

By P. V. Roundy, G. R. Mansfield

PUBLIC lands in Florida were first withdrawn from entry by President Taft on July 2, 1910, as a conservation measure because of their possible phosphate content. The reserve thus established was subsequently modified by further withdrawals and by restorations, so that on Jan. 1, 1934, it contained 66,796 acres, of which only a small part had been definitely classified. The reserved land was in scattered parcels, ranging from less than 40 acres to 320 or more, distributed in many counties. For administrative purposes and for final disposal of any of the numerous parcels, mineral classification of the land is legally necessary. In 1934 and 1935 the United States Geological Survey, under two successive grants from the Public Works Administration, prospected some 83 tracts of these lands in Polk County, comprising in all about 3300 acres, and six tracts comprising 240 acres in Citrus and Marion Counties. The tracts in Polk County were all in the so-called land-pebble field and the others in the hard-rock field. The Survey field party was under the direction of P. V. Roundy, from whose unpublished report the material in this paper is largely taken. The foreman of the prospecting crew was J. H. Wingate of Zephyrhills, Fla. The individual tracts were identified through the cooperation of the General Land Office, by transitman Hugh B. Crawford. This prospecting work fitted well the classification adopted for Public Works projects in general: it could not be done on any considerable scale under the Survey's usual appropriations; it gave employment to unemployed labor; and it may be expected ultimately to repay the Government in royalties more than the cost of the exploration. COMMERCIAL PROSPECTING METHODS Commercial methods of prospecting for phosphate in Florida have been briefly described by Mansfield.1 In the hard-rock field, where the floor of the phosphate deposit is extremely irregular, it is customary to drill as

Jan 1, 1937

By C. Y. Chen

In order to put an end to the uneven environmental standards and enforcement established by various coal mining States in the United States, the Congress passed and the President signed the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (Public Law 95-87 or the Act) on August 3, 1977. Within one year after passage, the Secretary of the Interior was directed to promulgate permanent program regulations implementing Title V provisions of the Act. These regulations were to form the basis for State regulatory programs under the Act and to allow States to assume primary regulatory responsibility. In order to implement the underground mining provision of the Act, the Secretary is directed in section 516(a) of the Act to promulgate rules, but ones which take into consideration the distinct differences between surface coal mining and underground coal mining. The regulations developed by the Secretary and promulgated on March 13, 1979, with respect to subsidence control, included (1) a subsidence control plan as part of the permitting process, (2) substantive provisions establishing performance standards for subsidence control, and (3) provisions providing for the prohibition of mining under perennial streams, impoundments larger than 20 acre feet, and certain public facilities and urban areas.

Jan 1, 1985

By David E. Jones, Dean K. Hunt, C. Y. Chen

INTRODUCTION Of all the numerous geological hazards that threaten the well-being of urban areas in the United States, probably none is so widespread, persistent, and diversified as surface subsidence (HRB-Singer, Inc., 1977). Simply defined, subsidence is the vertical displacement or sinking of the ground surface caused by either natural phenomena or man's activities. The downward movement, however, can be accompanied by horizontal movement, strain, tilt and even by a locally upward movement. Damage to structures and the environment can result from any of these movements. Extracting subsurface materials, fluids and solids, accounts for most man-induced subsidence in the United States. Among all the mining-related subsidences, the collapse of voids created by underground coal mining has been the major cause in inflicting surface damage (Comptroller General of the United States, 1979). Subsidence from coal mining may occur within a few weeks or be delayed for years, depending upon the mineral layer's depth below the surface, the overlying rock strata's characteristics, the extent and methods of mining that were employed, and the time deterioration of pillar and mine structure. Unless underground resources are not mined or control measures are implemented to prevent or minimize damage, some degree of surface subsidence and its accompanied deleterious effects are often inevitable. The ways to control the subsidence and minimize surface damage may include: 1. Precautionary measures built into new structures or surface features. 2. Preventive works applied to existing structures or surface features. 3. Mine design incorporating special underground layouts. 4. Any combination of the above measures. Upon the enactment of Public Law 95-87, the Secretary of the Interior, through the recently created Office of Surface Mining (OSM), was authorized to promulgate rules to regulate mining reclamation including subsidence control. Proposed on September 18, 1978, these rules were finalized, following public comment and hearings, on March 13, 1979, as part of the permanent regulatory program for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations which include the surface effects of underground mining. On January 28, 1981, Secretary Watt of the Department of the Interior issued an order to re- quire all agencies to identify with recommendations all regulations which are believed to be excessive, burdensome or counterproductive. Also on February 17, 1981. President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12291 requiring all Federal agencies to conduct a regulatory review to make a determination that each promulgation of a regulation is clearly within the authority delegated by law and consistent with Congressional intent (Federal Register, 1981). As a result, OSM initiated the regulatory reform to revise the permanent regulatory program. Following a brief discussion of the technical aspects and the effects of subsidence on man and his environment, this paper presents a historical overview of how rules and regulations are used to govern the subsidence related problems. The development of the regulation of subsidence under Public Law 95-87, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA or the Act) are also discussed, including the new regulations being developed under the regulatory reform program. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS Am EFFECTS OF FINE SUBSIDENCE An extensive historical review of mining subsidence is given by Zwartendyk (1971) and Shadbolt (1978). Comprehensive technical presentations have been given by Henry (1956), King and Whetton (1957), Hall and Orchard (1963). Muller, et al. (1968). Grard (1969), Voight and Pariseau (1970). Kapp and Williams (1972), Cummins and Given (1973), Brauner (1973) , and NCB (1975). A theory of surface subsidence due to underground mining was perhaps first fundamentally stated by a French engineer, Toillez, in 1838, and formulated by a Belgian engineer, Gonot, in 1839 (Goldreich, 1913, cited by Zwartendyk, 1971). Since that time,

Jan 1, 1982

By Rajesh K. Mishra

The person in charge of Environmental Affairs in a small business has many higher priority projects (such as making money to meet the employee? payroll etc.) than filling out and filing the regulatory forms. It is but. natural to think that these affairs can be managed? by playing ignorant until audited by the regulatory -state and federal agencies. Truth is to. the contrary; generally, it is too late by then. The fines and legal costs even for failing to file the regulatory forms could deliver a serious blow to the financial well-being of a small business. Forms and reports under SARA Title III are not hard to complete., but they are time consuming. In this paper we will discuss the information and data compilation procedures, simplification of some legal terminology into simple technical language, and tips that help in filling out the forms?. Some actual case 'histories of EPA fines will also be reviewed.

Jan 1, 1992

By Thomas V. Falkie

In bygone days, the mineral engineer spent most of his/her time on the technical aspects of designing, building, and managing mineral operations. In the last few decades, mostly since the 1960s, increasing amounts of engineering man power and time are spent dealing with federal, state, and local government agencies, laws, and regulations. It is not possible to plan, design, build, or operate mines, mills, smelters, or even office buildings without detailed consideration of government regulations and permitting requirements dealing with environment, worker health and safety, etc. The four chapters of this section provide an overview of the social, legal, political, environmental, and health and safety aspects of mineral enterprise. The section sets the stage for the working engineer/geologist in industry, government, consulting, or academe and points the direction for more detailed study in each of these areas.

Jan 1, 2008

Government geoscience may be categorised by objective under three headings: Applied Research for Geoscientific Framework Studies, Resource Inventory, and Technical Advice. In Queensland, the Department of Resource Industries is active in all three categories. Under the program-based management system adopted in 1987, three Programs, namely, Geological Survey, Mineral Resources Development, and Energy Resources Development and Utilisation, have geoscience responsibilities.Prime responsibility for geoscience resides with the Geological Survey Program, which provides a geoscientific framework for mineral and energy exploration and the development of the State. Simply stated, the Program goal is to provide geological information when and where it is required. Geological Survey work also encompasses aspects of resource inventory and technical advice, complementing the work of the other two Programs. This role has a 122 year long tradition, for geoscientists of the Geological Survey have been engaged in investigations designed to facilitate the identification and utilisation of the mineral, water and energy resources of Queensland since 1868.

Jan 1, 1990

Australia's gold mining industry has seen a resurgence in the past seven years - a resurgence the likes of which has been seen in very few, if any of this nation's other mineral industries. Industry experts are predicting that Australia could become one of the world's largest gold producers as the future of the South African gold industry looks increasingly tenuous under the present political crisis in that country. Therefore, it is utterly ludicrous for the Federal Government to introduce a tax which will see the Australian gold industry "wither on the vine."The Queensland State Government is utterly opposed to a tax on gold. Anyone in their right mind, who has seen the statistics could only agree with our stance. In 1984/85, activity in the gold mining industry is estimated to have accounted for over $750 million in national income, over$1,200 million in national output, and tax revenue of at least $115 million as well as providing more than 16,000 jobs. Chartered accountants Coopers and Lybrand's survey on the gold industry last year showed an increase in exploration expenditure by gold producers and explorers by up to 36% in 1986 from 1985 levels. That level is expected to be maintained in real terms for most of the remainder of the decade under the present tax arrangements. This is in contrast with the mining sector as a whole, where a recent Australian Mining Industry Council survey forecasted a 14% FALL in production.

Jan 1, 1986

In spite of our deep conviction that it would be wrong for the United States to enter World War II, when, after Pearl Harbor, we were actually in it, I felt that I must do all I could to help. The country had been so good to me that I could not decently stay on the sidelines. My first thought was that I might help with supply and administration in the Air Force, as in World War I. So on the evening of Pearl Harbor I wired the chief of our Air Force in Washington saying that I had been on Gen. William Mitchell's staff in World War I and was offering my services again. I received a noncommital answer, but after a couple of weeks was told to take my physical examination. I passed it, but nothing further happened. After helping to make plans for the wartime operations of Summit King and Desert Silver, Dorothy and I went to New York to spend Christmas with Molly and Peter, both of whom were in college in the East. I had to complete a report on the Argonaut mine in California first, though the war made my recommendations of dubious validity. Before Christmas I received wires from Temple Bridgeman, Phil Wilson, and other friends who had taken positions with government agencies responsible for securing mineral products needed for war use. They urged me to join them. It was evidently a case of not whether but how I could be most useful. After six uncertain days with the family in New York I took the night train to Washington on the 28th of December. I had a hectic day there. First I saw Arthur Bunker and Phil Wilson at what became the Aluminum and Magnesium Division of the War Production Board. Their office was in an old converted barracks. They asked me to examine magnesium deposits in Nevada at once, and then to look at other magnesium and aluminum properties. After leaving

Jan 1, 1976

By A. Eftimie, M. Stanley

The World Bank Group (WBG) believes that extractive industries can make significant contribution to sustainable development and poverty reduction, providing that environmental, social, and corporate governance issues are properly managed. The WBG recognizes that stakeholders have legitimate concerns about the impact of extractive industries, and management proposals are built around the central theme that investments and policy advice in the extractive industries should lead to poverty reduction. To help governments create appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks, this paper focuses on the linkages between overarching policies and laws and the management / governance of extractive industries at the local communities. It encourages the use of new instruments designed to help ensure that local communities benefit from extractive industries.

Jan 1, 2005