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By E. J. Gleim

"Information gathered during recent months by field men of the U. S. Bureau of Mines shows that in one State alone there have been 71 fatalities from electrical causes during the last 51/2 years, of which 55 were from contact with mine trolley wires operated at 250 volts or less, direct current. The 1928 law relating to the guarding of trolley wires in the-mines of this particular State reads: ""All trolley wires carrying a voltage of class 2 must be properly shielded except where the same are at least 61/2 feet above top of rail."" Class 2 voltage is defined as being ""between 300 volts and 600 volts direct current, or 240 volts and 480 volts alternating current."" From this it may be inferred that no guards are required, for 250-volt trolley wires, and the natural conclusion to be drawn is that the lack of guards or shields must be held responsible for these fatalities. To prevent fatalities from this source, it has been advocated that every foot of trolley wire in mines should be guarded. While some such drastic step may appear to be amply justified, a closer examination of the records shows that lack of guards is not entirely responsible but rather that carelessness and neglect in the observance of certain well-established simple rules concerning installation and location of trolley wires must also bear a share in the responsibility. In -other words, if trolley wire is installed carelessly and its maintenance neglected, failure may be expected of any guards that have been put up.There are a-number of factors affecting safety as related to trolley wires in mines, among which the following may be enumerated.1. Installation relative to track and passageways.2. Guarding.3. Maintenance.4. Discipline.Acknowledgment is made to D. Harrington and K. L. Marshall of the safety division of the bureau for assistance given in securing data on cost of installing guards for trolley wires.The statement that fatalities should not be charged in every case to lack of guards is supported by the following example: A man operating a locomotive was electrocuted when the trolley wheel jumped the 250-volt trolley wire and allowed it to sag against his shoulder. He was sitting in the regular place provided in the locomotive, but the wire was 11 inches inside of the rail and only 39 inches above it where the wire touched him, or 11 inches from the roof at a distance of 12 feet from the nearest hanger. The accident occurred between two hangers 44 feet apart, and the trolley wire was inside the rail over the entire distance, being 2 inches inside at one hanger and 10 inches inside at the other hanger. A bolt in the roof indicated that there had been a hanger at one time between the two on the 44-foot span.This example is a violation of good practice in the installation and maintenance of trolley wire. In the first place the wire should have been outside instead of inside the rail. In the second place there should have been at least one intermediate hanger so that the span would not be so great and the sag would be reduced. Furthermore, it is possible that the wire was not taut enough even when the intermediate hanger was in place.To provide a degree of safety for men in the mines certain coal-mining States, recognizing the need, have enacted laws to regulate the installation of trolley wires. These limit the distance that the wire must be kept outside and above the rail. Thus, the 1927 mining laws of Ohio specify that:"

Apr 1, 1932

Tables

Jan 1, 1992

Objective: To identify and evaluate a durable, flexible, and practical stopping to direct ventilation airflows in large-opening metal/nonmetal mines.

May 1, 2006

By David Hoadley, Kenneth R. Maser, Ashok B. Boghani, James E. Billar, D. Randolph Berry, Mackenzie Burnett, Robert H. Trent

C 3 Hoist Assemblies (Man rated) A total of nine companies were identified who manufacture and supply man-rated hoisting equipment suitable for below ground installations. 1. The Coeur d' Alenes Company

Jan 1, 1976

By Amanda Azman, Richard Hi Danie/son

Ultimately, the most important product of a hearing conservation program is the prevention of hearing loss, not the amount of hearing protection that has been purchased or whether employees are attending their annual training sessions. Audiometric testing directly reveals whether hearing losses are actually occurring in a plant. With audiometric data, we can assess overall program effectiveness, alert workers of impending hearing loss, and reveal potential employer liabilities for compensable hearing loss. Without the ability to efficiently analyze audiometric data or produce effective reports, our programs become fruitless and unproductive. Consequently, ifaudiometric data are such vital end-products, then effective audiometric technologies serve as the prime architect and generator of these fundamental data. These technologies, consisting ofaudiometers, associated peripheral hardware, and database/reporting software, deserve our consideration.

By Raymond F. Helinski, Linda J. McWilliams, Sean Gallagher, Thomas R. Battenhouse, August J. Kwitowski, John R. Bartels, Dean H. Ambrose

This report examines the boom arm vertical speed for roof bolting machines to study a moving boom arm appendage at different speeds during different work scenarios. The goal of this study is to determine the impact of the appendage speed on the likelihood of the operator's hand, arm, head, or leg making contact, such as touching the moving appendage. The overall research goal is to reduce workers' risks to injury from exposure to underground mining machinery. Accident investigation reports from the Mine Safety and Health Administration do not usually contain enough information to aid in studying this problem, and lab experiments with human subjects are not feasible because of safety issues. As an alternative, researchers used a unique computer simulation model that uses a virtual human, vision tracking, and generates random virtual human motions and risky work behaviors. By using specialized software to simulate the computer model, researchers accurately identified potential hazards of tasks where it is not possible to perform experiments with human subjects. Results of a frequency distribution analytic approach show that, regardless of other variables, contact incidents were always greater when the boom was moving up, always greater on the hand, and always greater or the boom arm part of the machine. The reason why the subject experiences more contacts when the boom arm is moving up rather than down is that more risky behaviors occur during drilling and bolting when the boom is ascending. Results of a cross-tabulation analytic approach show that the 25th-percentile operators experienced more contacts than other operator sizes and had most of their contacts during a boom speed of 13 in/sec. The hand-on-boom behavior during drilling and bolting tasks experienced more contacts than other work behaviors, and both tasks had most of their contacts during speed 13 in/sec. The 60-in seam experienced more contacts than other seam heights and had most of the contacts during speed 16 in/sec. For univariate logistic regression models, seam height is the most important predictor of the probability of a contact. However, a multivariate logistic regression model predicted contacts are more likely with the both-knee work posture in the 60-in seam, a 25th-percentile operator compared to a 55th-percentile operator, and speeds 16 and 22 in/sec compared to 7 in/sec. Results of a survival analytic approach suggest that controlling the boom speed is the most important factor in determining the risk of an operator making contact. Based on the data collected, boom speeds greater than13 in/sec result in a substantial increase in risk to the roof bolter operator making contact. Speeds less than or equal to 13 in/sec are associated with a more modest relative risk of making contact, which represents a decrease in potential hazard. Virtual operator's response time has little effect on the number of contacts experienced. The mining industry can use the information in this study to reduce the likelihood that roof bolter operators will experience injury due to contact with a moving roof bolting machine's boom arm.

Jan 5, 2005

By W. R. Reed

Dust dispersion modeling is a subject that has had a large amount of research activity. Much of the research has focused on large-scale global or regional dispersion models. Other models have been created for industry-specific purposes. Furthermore, some of the past research has focused on dust dispersion modeling in the mining industry. This report presents the various dust dispersion models that have been developed specifically for the mining industry. The report first gives a brief background of the regulatory environment that helped to promote development of such models. It then presents an overview of the mathematical concepts used in this dispersion modeling. Finally, each of the various models developed for the mining industry are described, along with their associated mathematical algorithms and any field validation conducted on the different models.

Jan 9, 2005

By R. D. Leitch, W. P. Yant

"In the course of another investigation4 during 1926 and 1927, samples of water collected from a few abandoned coal mines indicated that their drainage was usually lower in acidity than water from active mines in the same locality. In order to determine whether this condition might have a bearing on the advisability of sealing abandoned mines, a number of such mines were visited, samples of drainage were collected, and as much information- as possible was obtained from officials of the mining companies and older residents of the district. The results of this work are the basis of the present report.The authors are indebted to E. W. Robertson, F. F. Spowart, J. H. Nagle, and W. D. Adams of the Northwest Mining & Exchange Co.; E. M. Fasset, Fred Lane, Wm. Humphreys, and Dr. T. A. Hutchison of Brockway, Pa.; C. W. .Faulk of the Shawmut Mining Co.; James Hau of Kersey, Pa., and to others for information received; and to Dr. R. R. Sayers of the Bureau of Mines, under whose direction the work was conducted.The Lower Kittanning is the most important bed in the locality studied. A great many of the abandoned mines examined are in this bed, and nearly all of the present active ones are. The Upper Freeport bed is also mined to some extent, and a number of the abandoned mines formerly worked this bed. As only three active mines are now (1927) working the Upper Freeport, the comparison of acidities is necessarily limited. Of these three, one had been idle since 1922 until shortly before it was sampled.The location of most of the mines was already known from previous work, but some of them had to be located by following up streams known to contain acid waters. A sample of the- outflow was collected in self-sealing bottles known as ""citrate bottles"" for the determination of dissolved oxygen by the Winkler method.5 Another sample was taken for the determination of acidity according to standard methods of water analysis.6 Ferrous iron was determined at the mine or very soon after taking the sample by titrating with a standard solution of potassium permanganate in acid solution. The hydrogen-ion value was determined by a standard double-wedge comparator.7From the total acidity values in each sample, which are the most important values, the total iron was calculated on the assumption that acidity as sulphuric acid was due to dissolved ferrous sulphate. This assumption is commonly made for mine waters, but is inaccurate to the extent that free acid is already present, and some of the iron is present as ferric, rather than ferrous, sulphate. The amount of ferrous sulphate may be a rough measure of the extent to which oxygen is lacking within the mine. The permanganate titrations just mentioned showed what part of this total iron was in combination as ferrous sulphate, and the difference .was assumed to be that in combination as ferric sulphate, after correcting for the amount of free acid already formed as shown by the titration values."

Oct 1, 1928

By Joseph A. DeCarlo

This information circular presents data for 1960 on individual coke plants in the United States. All oven-coke plants in existence, whether active or idle at the close of the year, are listed in this report. With two exceptions, only beehive plants on which reports were submitted to the Bureau of Mines are included. Although the Bureau was unable to obtain reports from these two active plants in 1960, the number of ovens and annual coke capacity are estimates, based on previous reports filed with the Bureau of Mines. Accordingly, there were 73 oven-coke plants in existence at the end of 1960 of which 70 were active. Reports were received on 44 beehive plants of which only 13 were in operation at year end. Oven-coke plants are listed alphabetically by States in table 1 which shows the name and address of the company, location of plant, classification or type of ownership, number and type of ovens, annual coke capacity, and coal-chemical materials produced. The terms "furnace" and "merchant" plants used in this and all other reports of the Bureau of Mines designate the type of ownership. Furnace plants are those owned by iron and steel companies whose main business is production of coke for use in their own blast furnaces. Merchant plants are those associated with chemical companies, gas utilities, as well as those that produce for sale on the open market metallurgical, industrial, and residential-heating grades of coke and coal-chemical materials. The annual coke capacity shown for each plant in this table is based on the minimum coking time necessary to produce coke with qualities suitable for its intended use. Therefore, the annual capacity of a plant may change from year to year, depending on age and condition of ovens, the character and quality of coal carbonized, the grade of coke required, and other factors. For example, annual coke capacity of a coke plant primarily making foundry coke with longer coking cycles would be lower than one making blast-furnace coke. Also some ovens must be operated at slightly lower than normal flue temperature because of the condition of the refractories and maximum capacity would be somewhat lower than designed capacity. For this reason, the capacity reported to the Bureau of Mines may differ from the designed or rated capacity estimated by the coke-oven builders at the time of construction. For example, if the generally accepted standard coking rate of one inch per hour were used on all ovens to calculate total annual capacity, it would have been 80.4 million tons or 2 percent higher than the capacity reported to the Bureau. Because of the factors mentioned above, the annual coke capacity shown in this table is believed to be a reliable measure of the practical operating capacity of the industry.

Jan 1, 1961

By R. R. Sayers

"According to the dictionary,3 an accident is an event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation, often an undesigned, sudden, and unforeseen occurrence of an afflictive or unfortunate character. However, actual experience with accidents, the second most important cause of death in the United States,4 and a more extensive and scientific inventigation of their causes indicate that from 75 to 90 per cent of accidents are avoidable.5 This is borne out by the results of a three-year study of the accident records of 64,000 motor vehicle operators in New York6 which show that certain drivers are prone to accidents, that accident experience is traceable to certain causes, and that accidents don't just ""happen,"" It is estimated that 97,000 persons were killed by accidents in the United States in 1929 and 15,000,000 were injured. Of these about 23,000 deaths were due to so-called industrial accidents. In a list of accident rates by industries, compiled by the National Safety Council7 from reports of member establishments, mining heads the list, in both frequency (74.43 per 1,000,000 man-hours worked) and severity (9.9 days lost per 1,000 man-hours worked). These figures are very much higher than for any other industry; theindustries showing figures most comparable to mining are meat packing with a frequency rate of 55.94 and a severity rate of 1.47, construction with a frequency rate of 50.41 and a severity rate of 4.62, and refrigeration with a frequency rate of 43.35 and a severity rate of 3.04.While there is no way to determine the actual cost of all accidents from a monetary standpoint, estimates indicate that the cost will run into hundreds of millions of dollars annually.Cost of accidents in metal mines.- The United States Bureau of Mines obtains accurate figures on the number of lost-time nonfatal accidents as well as fatal accidents in the metal-mining industry.8 In 1926 the metal mines employed 127,823 men; 430 men were killed and 30,350 men received lost-time but nonfatal injuries as a result of accidents. Each of these fatal and nonfatal injuries averaged 114 days lost time, computing a fatality as 6,000 days lost time. This is equivalent to 3,523,944 days time lost due to accident, or at $5 per day per man, to a wage loss of $17,619,720. Deducting one-ninth of this figure for compensation paid, the metal miner loses in wage annually about $15,700,000, or about $122 per individual. This average loss per individual includes the cost of fatal accidents reckoned at 6,000 days or $30,000, but even if the loss in time due to fatal accidents be deducted, the average cost to each individual metal miner each year for nonfatal accidents is about $32. Estimating the loss to the metal-mine employer as about the same as that to the employee, the annual cost of metal-mine accidents to the employer is about $15,700,000 and to the employer and miner is $31,400,000."

Oct 1, 1930

By Walter R. Storms, Allan B. Bowman

This paper , which describes mining methods and practices at the Mineral Hill copper mine , is one of a series being prepared by the Division of Minerals of the Bureau of Mines on mining methods , practices , and costs in various mining districts. of the United States . The Mineral Hill mine is situated on the northeastern piedmont of the Sierrita Mountains at an altitude of 3,650 feet in sec . 35 , T. 16 S. , R. 12 E. , and sec . 2 , T. 17 S. , R. 12 E. , Pima mining district , Pima County , Ariz . ( fig . 1 ) . The claims (figs . 2 and 3) are in a gently rolling area with only scant desert vegetation . The average annual precipitation is about 11 inches . The nearest surface water is the Santa Cruz River , an intermittent stream 8 miles east of the mine . The property is owned by the Banner Mining Co. , a Nevada corporation . This report presents a brief history of the mine , describes the geology of the area and the ore deposits , outlines methods of prospecting and exploration , and gives methods of sampling and the estimation of ore reserves and values . Development and stoping methods are explained , and methods of underground transportation , ventilation , mine drainage , and safety measures are described . The concluding section of the paper is a section on milling . The Mineral Hill mine is an old mine that was reopened in 1951 after having been closed for 30 years .

May 1, 1957

By E. H. Denny

"Reduction of mine accidents appears to depend upon essentially the same fundamentals, whether considered from the viewpoint of the mine operator, miner, State mine inspector, or safety engineer. Conditions of mine operation with respect to safety are governed in most States by a mining law, usually somewhat general in its provisions but more specific than laws dealing with other industries, Methods of mining development and practice evolved through experience have been handed down from generation to generation; many of these are intended to avoid injury to men and also loss of property. To carry out the intent of these bases of law and experience relating to safety supplemental measures and conditions are necessary. Among these may be: (1) Planned safety rules adapted to the mine and compliance by both officials and Miners with such of these rules as pertain to their work; (2) a supervisory force adequate and competent to ¬administer the mining laws and safety rules; (3) discipline adequate to secure compliance with safety measures; (4) safeguards against mechanical, electrical, falling, and other hazards; (5) mining operations planned with respect to safety of workers; (6) an active safety organization of officials and employees; (7) education of officials and employees in safety practices; and (8) an active sustained interest in safety by management and employees.This paper presents the viewpoint of the safety engineer, though a safety engineer connected with a specific mine or group of mines would be in a better position than the writer to present the industrial engineer's thought. The application of the mine safety fundamentals just outlined will be given consideration from observations of methods used by safety engineers and supervisors.The term ""safety engineer"" includes men of various duties, various degrees of experience, and various authority. Depending upon the size of the operation or the interest of the management in safety, the safety engineer may have accident prevention as his sole duty; he may be the head of a sizable safety organization; or he may be in part a claim agent; a statistician compiling figures for the enlightenment of the company, the public, or a mining institute meeting; a surveyor who must convince the miner that his scale of 10/10 equals 1 foot does not defraud the miner of 6 inches to every yard measured; or he may be by heaven¬ly gift an orator capable of assuring the employees that ""all's right with the world""; he may be a young engineer gaining, experience while checking the observance of company rules and investigating accidents; or he may have the physical ills frequently resulting from several decades of mining experience and instead of a pension, the position of safety engineer has fallen to his lot. He may have mine-operating authority to correct immediately a dangerous condition or practice or he may have his recommendations officially disregarded at the monthly meeting or when the bottom of the desk basket is reached. He is likely to find that his viewpoint on accident reduction is considered unsound today because of youth and inexperience and unsound later because of old age and senility. He is likely to find the easiest course to be that of attributing to Providence and the carelessness of the worker the mishaps that result in the removal of a man to the hospital or the morgue."

Dec 1, 1936

By S. J. Pearce

The Bureau of Mines has prepared, as circumstances have dictated, a series of Schedules setting forth the minimum requirements that various types of equipment should meet to be considered safe and satisfactory for use in certain hazardous or unhealthful conditions. These Schedules cover a wide variety of devices ranging from explosives to electrically operated mine locomotives. This paper deals with those Bureau of Mines Schedules under which respiratory protective devices are tested and approved, and its purpose is to explain the function and operation of these Schedules. Provisions have been made for testing and approval of the following types of respiratory protective devices: Self-contained breathing apparatus,2/ supplied-air respirators,3/ gas masks,4/ dispersoid respirators,5/ and chemical cartridge respirators.6 These devices are tested at the Central Experiment Station of the Bureau of Mines in Pittsburgh, Pa. Self-contained breathing apparatus is tested by the Safety Branch, and the other types of respirators are tested by the Health Branch.

Jan 1, 1951

By N. S. Dalal, X. Shi, V. Vallyathan

"Electron spin resonance (ESRJ spectrum of the hydroxyl (· OH) radical spin adduct with .the spin trap 5,5-dimethyl-1-pyrrolintt-N-oxide has been obtained in suspensions of freshly ground quartz particles. The concentration of the spin adduct (and hence of the • OH radicals) increases with the amount of grinding. The dust's potential for the generation of the· OH radicals is maximum when fresh (i.e., immediately after grinding) and decreases to 50% in about a day on storage in air. Studies involving metal chelates .indicate that the • OH radical formation involves mainly the silica surface and H20 rather than the Fenton reaction. The results suggest that hydroxyl radical reaction(s) could be important in the lipid peroxidation and fibrogenicity by quartz dust, particularly .in acute silicosis. INTRODUCTIONIn this paper we report on our electron spin resonance (ESR) detection of the formation of hydroxyl (·OH) radicals in aqueous suspensions of freshly crushed quartz particles. This work was undertaken with a view to find possible clues to the role of free radicals in the pathogenesis of quartz-induced fibrogenicity, commonly known as silicosis. We noted that while silicosis is one of the major health hazards in coal and mineral industries, the mechanism by which the quartz particles exert their toxic action on cells and the process(es) by which these actions progress to fibrogenesis are still poorly ·understood (Reiser and Last, 1979; Singh and .Rahman, 1987). It is generally thought, nevertheless, that the action of quartz particles on the biological membranes is the starting point of the silicotic process (Parazzi et - al., 1968). A possible clue to the mechanism of the membrane damage by quartz particles, in terms of the role of oxygenated free radicals, is suggested by the following observations. A suspension of quartz particles in contact with alveolar macrophages has been reported (Gabor et al., 1975; Koike et al., 1982) to initiate an enhancement of lipid peroxidation, defined broadly as the oxidative deterioration of polyunsaturated components of lipids. Hydroxyl (· OH) radicals are known to be capable of peroxidation by abstracting hydrogen atoms from cell-membrane lipids (Halliwell and Gutteridge, 1985) and of initiating lipid peroxidation in lysosomal membranes. (Fong et al., 1973). Arong other lines, it is known that exposure of cell membranes, fatty acids, and unsaturated food oils to ionizing radiation, which generates· OH radicals, causes rapid peroxidation (Halliwell and Gutteridge, 1985). Thus • OH radicals (and also other oxygenated species such as Oi, 10 2, and H20 2) might be expected to play a role in the toxicity of quartz. Earlier studies of the aqueous chemistry of quartz suspensions have reported detection of H2O 2 (Kalbanev et al., 1980), implicating the formation of ·OH radicals as transient species. However, we are not aware of any report of the detection of • OH radicals in quartz reactions, and thus the present study was undertaken. Since it-is known that, because of their high reactivity (hence short lifetime) in aqueous media, the • OH radicals cannot be detected via ESR directly (Finkelstein et al., 1980; Buettner, 1982) we have used .ESR combined with the spin-trap methodology (Finkelstein et al., 1980) for studying the· OH formation. The results show that· OH radicals are indeed formed in aqueous suspensions of freshly ground quartz; thus pointing to ·a possible new clue to the cytotoxicity of freshly formed quartz particles and thereby to silica fibrogenicity."

Jan 1, 1988

By D. Harrington, M. W. Von Bernewitz

"The erection of barricades by men who are shut off from escape in mines at time of fire or after an explosion has been consistently advocated by the United States Bureau of Mines. Largely through the publicity given by the bureau to this excellent type of emergency safety endeavor, several hundred lives have been saved during the past 20 years. One of the earliest instances of barricading in the United States of which there is fairly complete record was in connection with the Cherry mine fire in Illinois in 1909; in this fire 259 lives were lost, but 20 men were saved by two barricades and were brought safely to the surface after seven days. In another coal-mine fire, followed later. on by an explosion, at Delagua, Colo., in 1910, 79 lives were lost, but 18 men saved themselves by erecting canvas brattices or barricades; the miners in one barricade were removed safely after five hours and those in another after 21 hours. In 1911, after an explosion in a coal mine at Briceville, Tenn., in which 84 lives were lost, five persons were brought out alive after 58 hours behind a barricade. Twenty hours after an explosion in which 73 were killed at McCurtain, Okla., in 1912, 13 men were taken out alive and one dead from behind a barricade or partition constructed of canvas. In 1914, after an explosion at Eccles, W. Va., in which 181 were killed, 35 men barricaded themselves in one place and after four hours were brought to the surface alive; this barricade was also of canvas. In 1915, 112 men were killed in an explosion at Layland, W. Va., but two groups of men, 47 in all, were able to barricade themselves; after four days 46 men were rescued alive, but one man was dead. In 1915, an explosion at Boomer, W. Va., killed 23, but 27 others barricaded themselves in one place and after seven hours came out alive. All of the foregoing instances of barricading were in coal mines. In 1917 there were three cases of barricading in a Montana metal-mine fire (the North Butte) during which 163 lives were lost. One of the barricades, sheltering 19 men, failed because the region barricaded was in porous broken ground through which the poisonous gases seeped and killed the entire group. From another of the barricades, engineered by an assistant foreman, 8 men were taken out, 6 uncon¬scious and 2 dead, 50 hours after the fire started. The 6 unconscious men lived, out the assistant foreman who directed the men was one of the 2 who had died. In the third case of barricading in this metal-mine fire,,men, also led by an assistant foreman, kept themselves closed in for about b6 hours and then broke barricade or bulkhead, 25 oing in one direction to safety, and 4, including the assistant foreman, going in another direction to death from poisonous gases. There have been a number of other cases of barricading, some successful and others a failure. Probably the worst failure was that in the argonaut (gold) mine fire in California in 1922; all of a group of 46 miners behind a barricade were found dead when reached after 21 days."

Apr 1, 1933

By D. Harrington, C. W. Owings

"The belief is now fairly general among the coal-mining people of the United States that one of the most effective methods of preventing wide-spread coalmine .explosions is that of introducing rock-dust into coal mines to reduce the inflammability or explosibility of dusts found on mine surfaces. Notwithstanding this belief it is improbable that even a small fraction of 1 per cent of the coal mines of the United States are at all adequately protected by rock-dust; in a survey made in the summer, and fall of 1927 it was found that but 463 out of more than 7,000 operating bituminous and lignitic coal mines were using rock-dust at all, and that few if any of the 463 were fully or adequately protected by rock-dusting.Inspections of a large number of mines through the United States by Bureau of Mines safety division field men have failed to reveal a single adequately rock-dusted mine, Yet there is no doubt that many of the owners and operators believed their properties to be fully protected by rock-dust against the much-feared hazard of widespread explosion. Two of the most disastrous explosions of recent years occurred at properties where the owners were definitely of the belief that the rock-dusting done had made the mines immune to widespread explosion involving coal-dust. In both instances it was found that although some rock-dusting had been done, the mines were more nearly 1 per cent than 100 per cent rock-dusted.This condition as to inefficiency or insufficiency of rock-dusting in the coal mines of the United States is almost universal, and unless our mining men awaken to its, dangers, the disaster record of the coal-mining industry is much more likely to become worse than better. During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1928, the attention of the safety division of the United States Bureau of Mines was called to. 22 explosions With 320 fatalities in bituminous coal mines of the United States; and of the 22 explosions there were 10 with 258 fatalities in mines that were listed as having used rock-dust; upon investigation it was found that as usual the rock-dusting had been anything but comprehensive or adequate. It is probable that in a very few instances last year the relatively small amount of rock-dusting stopped the .extension of the explosion and thus prevented further expansion of the death list. In general, however, the explosions occurred in a part of the mine that had not been rock-dusted - and right here is the crux of the failure or probable failure of present-day rock-dusting in the United States, There should be no part of any bituminous or coal mine in which all of the exposed surfaces (roof, ribs, and floor) have not been thoroughly rock-dusted and kept thoroughly rock-dusted. In other words, all exposed surfaces of all accessible places in bituminous and lignitic coal mines should be kept covered with rock-dust so that the combined rock-dust coal-dust mixture at all times and in all places has less than 35 or 40 per cent combustible matter, The only exception to this rule is that surfaces which are wet (and this does not mean merely damp) need not be rock-dusted. However, a mine opening may have several inches of water on the floor and yet have much explosive dust on the ribs and roof above the water; in such places the ribs and roof should be kept rock-dusted, irrespective of the wetness of the floor."

Nov 1, 1928

By R. D. Currie

The practicability and dependability of two permissible methane-indicat- in detectors recently developed were proved conclusively by extensive tests in the return airways of all mines operating in the anthracite region in most of which samples and readings were taken with one or the other of the two in- dicating detectors. These detectors roved dependable and accurate within practical limits, and their general use should be encouraged as an aid to bet ter ventilation, more accurate control of air currents, and greater safety in mines.

Feb 1, 1936

By R. V. Ramani, R. Stefanko, G. W. Luxbacher

CALCULATION OF MINE HEAD LOSSES FROM ALTIMETER SURVEY DATA USBM PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY - MINERAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT USBM USBM USBM THIS PROGRAM CALCULATES PRESSURE LOSSES USING THE USBM METHOD GIVEN USBM IN USBH IC 7809 BY MCELROY AND KINGERY.1957. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE USBM BETWEEN THIS PROGRAM AND THE CITED REFERENCE IS THE TREATMENT OF AIR USBM

Jan 1, 1977

By R. W. Stahl

"This study by the Federal Bureau of Mines was confined to pillaring with continuous mining machines and to mines where total extraction is practiced. Many different conditions and practices in as many coalbeds as possible in Pennsylvania were observed.Pillar extraction or pillaring can be the most productive part of coal mining if done properly; but it also can be the most dangerous if done improperly.Because of the need for more careful planning before and caution during pillaring, many mining companies resort to the undesirable practice of stumping or hogging of pillars with subsequent unnecessary waste of valuable natural resources. Pillaring can be done at reasonable cost and safely, as proven at many mines where complete extraction is practiced and enviable cost and accident records are maintained.Although continuous mining machines are bulky and sometimes difficult to maneuver, they have been used with great success in pillaring. Occasionally, however, a machine is caught, or men are injured by a fall during pillar recovery. This Bureau survey was conducted to ascertain how safe and successful pillaring (especially the removal of final stumps in lifts or the final stump of a pillar), is accomplished in some mines, while others have considerable difficulty under similar conditions.The Bureau hopes the information to be presented in this publication will prove beneficial to those who wish to recover more pillar coal and to improve their accident record during such procedures."

Dec 1, 1959

By Manuel Gomez

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the feasibility of using statistical response surface regression analysis to predict the sulfur and ash distributions and the washability characteristics of coal along a seam in advance of mining. Prediction equations were developed with experimental data from channel, bench, and core samples from the Pittsburgh coal seam in Greene County, Pa. It was not possible, with the available experimental data, to construct mathematical models to predict ash and sulfur concentrations between sample points. In the authors' opinion, however, the good agreement between experimentally determined and predicted values at given sample points demonstrates the usefulness of the method. More input data, such as geologic information, seam characteristics (rock-to-coal ratio), petrographic analysis, and chemical data, would perhaps make it possible to predict sulfur and ash concentrations and washability characteristics between sample points.

Jan 1, 1970