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By Larry Schneider

"0 ne of the incentives that led to the development of non-electric shock tube initiation systems was the desire within the industry to improve detonator safety. And to the extent that nonelectric initiators are immune to the hazards of stray current and radio frequency energy found on normal blast sites, an advancement in safety has been accomplished. However, as a cautionary note, it is important to realize that there are still many hazards associated with any initiation system. While some of these hazards may differ from those associated with electric detonators, others are identical to those associated with any type of initiation system. For instance, contrary to what some uninformedblasters may believe, lightning remains a hazard when using nonelectric initiation as well as electric initiation."

Jan 1, 1995

By Jerry Wallace

This project consisted of blasting for expansion of a major interstate natural gas transmission pipeline pump station. The pump station handled 400-500 million cubic feet (1 l- 14 million cubic meters) of gas per day.

Jan 1, 1996

By Jerry Wallace

The goal: At an industrial site, sever a well pipe containing an interior obstruction in a timely, cost effective manner by using a shape-charge to cut through the casing more than 50 meters below ground surface from the outside, doing so while inside a larger pipe, without damaging the larger pipe. The problem: Pumps and retrieval tools stuck nearly 50 meters below ground surface inside a 305 mm diameter by 9.5 mm wall thickness water well casing. The well, depth of 185 meters, had to be inspected for contaminates then properly decommissioned before industrial expansion could take place overhead. The limitations: A 508 mm diameter pipe had been driven around the 305 mm pipe to a depth of 63 meters. The usable internal diameter of the larger pipe was about 480 mm while the smaller pipe had buckled at one point forming a 350 mm wide spot. The charge thickness was limited to less than one-half the difference. Additionally, water that filled the annular space between the two pipes had to be displaced for the charge to work properly. The solution: Enlist the support of the shape-charge manufacturer to design, build and test a charge to work under the conditions present, then make it work in the field.

Jan 1, 2000

By Robert Morgan

The mind-set that only blasters and their helpers need training in explosives can result in risk to other employees working at mine or construction sites where blasting is conducted. Misfires are not always immediately obvious during postblast examinations performed by the certified blaster in charge; the presence of undetonated explosives may not appear until well within the muckpile as was the case in the photo, right. To avoid accidents involving misfires, follow safety procedures specified in mine safety regulations, and the ISEE Blaster’s Handbook that include the following:

Jan 1, 2004

By Erkan Bayrak, Serkan Erkara, Ozkan Duzgun, Ekin Gungor

This paper presents part of the outcomes of the drill and blast optimization project carried out at Kisladag Gold Mine in Turkey. Kisladag Gold Mine is the largest gold mine in Turkey with a low-grade, bulk-tonnage, open pit operation that uses heap leaching for gold recovery. After blasting, the ore is fed to a three-stage crushing circuit which prepares crushed ore approximately -10 mm (0.39 in) for heap leaching. Crusher downtime analysis showed that blocky material and insufficient feed are causing significant downtimes with the primary crusher. This was supported by the fragmentation data collected to date. It was decided to initiate a fragmentation project to understand the variation in the run-of-mine (ROM) size with a view to provide a consistent feed to the crushing circuit. The study includes the analyses of the ore strength and structure, image analysis of the fragmentation pictures acquired from blasts, blast auditing and quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) analyses. During this project, over 200 fragmentation pictures were acquired from 47 blasts to optimize ore and waste blasts. Ore strength varies between 30 and 120 MPa and rock quality designation (RQD) ranges between 30 and 100. A site-specific fragmentation model was used to calibrate the fragmentation for blast domains formed. In addition, alternative cases were simulated to achieve blasts designs with consistent ROM fragmentation size distribution. Alternative blast designs that include stemming length and powder factor changes were suggested. Long stemming length, drill cuttings use, free faced blasts, small shot sizes and poor stemming length control were some of the key issues causing coarse fragmentation.

Jan 1, 2015

By Ron Frye, Carl Liibbe, Wayne Curtis, Julie Pecori, Dan Leach

Test work comparing the performance of a Low Density Porous Ammonium Nitrate Prill to regular Porous Ammonium Nitrate conducted in Pennsylvania and New York showed that less ammonium nitrate was required to perform the same work and that improved sensitization of an emulsion/ammonium nitrate blend reduced “orange fumes”. Fragmentation was similar in all tests with improved heave and throw experienced.

Jan 1, 1997

By Alastair Grogan

In October of 2002, the author was retained by Public Works and Government Services Canada, on behalf of the Department of National Defense, to design, construct and test the effectiveness of a bubble curtain system at an underwater demolition range, near Victoria, BC. The purpose of the bubble curtain was to reduce the potential for fish mortalities at the site. This paper presents some of the elements of the design, along with the results of overpressure monitoring during blasting and compares the results of fish mortality and animal behaviors with and without the bubble curtain in operation.

Jan 1, 2005

By Ralph E. Burnham, Jeff Taylor, Jonson Montgomery, J. Kelly Ratliff, Rennie Montgomery, Martin Brashear

Top priorities for all blasting companies and individual blasters are risk management, safety of company personnel and the general public, regulatory compliance, and liability protection. On a daily basis, hundreds of shots are detonated by well-trained, skilled, and experienced blasters without incident. Unfortunately, accidents inevitably occur, which is why blasting is considered an “ultra hazardous” or “inherently dangerous” activity from a legal perspective. Despite countless regulations, recent advances in technology, improved training, ongoing research, and improved communication in the industry, mistakes and the resulting incidents continue to occur during blasting operations. These result in dangerous or deadly flyrock, site security lapses, increased complaints, blast damage claims, and lawsuits, which lead to increased insurance costs and other financial tolls for blasting companies. In life, lessons learned the hard way are rarely forgotten. The same is true in blasting operations. Blasting missteps and the resulting events are often the best catalysts for improving risk management and thereby reducing accidents, liability, and financial tolls. This paper provides a summary of two incidents, one safety and the other liability related, and the errors that resulted in a fatality in one case and a multi property lawsuit in the other. The two incidents provide examples that serve as a case study for lessons learned the hard way in blasting operations and offer guidance for the considerations that blasters and blasting companies should incorporate into daily operating procedures.

Jan 1, 2018

By J. Mikhael Erekson, Connie Campbell Brashear, Brent Meins

Christmas morning 2020, an IED in an RV was detonated along an evacuated section of downtown Nashville, Tennessee. The blast damaged over 40 buildings, including AT&T’s Main Central Office and caused internet and cell outages across 1,200 zip codes for three days including the airport and EMS services. Published investigations by the ATF and FBI were inconclusive in determining the explosive composition and size. Video captured a large fireball that may indicate a fuel-air-mixture explosion which would create lower peak pressures than high explosives, but longer pressure duration and significant impulsive loading. Blast pressures were amplified by reflections in the urban environment bordered by the 8-story AT&T building and a row of multi-story historic buildings. Some structures had little damage as they were shielded from the blast pressure by closer buildings, and seemingly far-field structures contained damage from the pressure wave after multiple reflections and propagation through porous parking garages. Damage to the reinforced concrete frame AT&T building included snapped masonry ties, cracking and spall to the closest column, and vertical displacement of the elevator, even with the brakes applied. The historic structures directly across the street from the blast partially collapsed. Initial damage included complete failures of unreinforced masonry façades, broken timber beams, and uplifted roofs. Secondary, progressive collapse took place over months as the brick walls and weakened historic mortar could not resist typical wind and environment loads. One of the close historic structures was renovated in the 1990’s and structural retrofits to comply with building codes were required. The addition of steel columns and façade tie-ins improved survivability and it remained standing with a high percentage of the front brick intact. Generally, the observed blast damage was related to a structural component’s mass and flexibility. Internal timber framing was unscathed, but many steel studs required replacement. Glazing damage was observed several blocks away and many roof membranes were punctured by falling debris. Secondary damage from broken sprinkler lines and loss of environmental control often led to more costly repairs than the initial blast pressure damage. The proliferation of bomb-making knowledge leads to hundreds of bombings each year in the US. Building risk considerations should include explosive threats along with other hazards. ASCE structural standards and design manuals have been published to address these risks and may be useful guides for building construction.

Feb 6, 2023

By Ray Jambakhsh, Gabrielle Bourget

In the summer of 1998, Ontario Hydro awarded a contract to demolish an obsolete and inefficient chimney by blasting. The Ontario Hydro Thunder Bay Thermal Generating Station (T.G.S.), is a fully operational hydro thermal generating station located in Thunder Bay, Ontario, Canada. The Chimney was a 356 ft (108 m) high freestanding structure constructed of reinforced concrete with a brick liner. Falling the chimney required careful planning due to the highly sensitive structures and equipment which surrounded it. Damage either sustained to the existing systems through ground vibrations or direct contact would have resulted in expensive power outage and/or lost production. The role of Explotech Engineering Ltd. on this project was to provide and evaluation of the proposed demolition procedure, defme the predicted and maximum seismic vibrations at sensitive structures including underground services, conduct pre-blast / post-blast inspections and recommend various safety precautions. The general contractor for the project, LeBrun Northern Contracting Ltd., of Thunder Bay, Ontario was responsible for all site preparations and post-blast clean up. All demolition blasting calculations and operations were conducted by Dykon demolition experts from Tulsa, Oklahoma. On September 13, 1999, the chimney was successfully demolished. Extensive analysis of the vibration records and visual post-blast inspections of the surrounding structures concluded that the demolition event induced no damage to any of the Ontario Hydro facilities.

Jan 1, 2000

I attended a funeral in West Monroe, Louisiana, for one of the best powder peddlers I’ve ever known. He started work in 1948 for Dixie Dynamite, a seismograph explosive distributor. His first job was as a truck driver, then magazine keeper and then sales re p re s e n t a t i v e . When Dixie Dynamite quit, he acted as an explosives sales agent for sometime before moving on to Kansas to be a sales rep for a distributor there. We called him the “ragin cajun” long before James Carville came on the national scene messing up things. While he was born in G e o rgia, he was a Cajun at heart. I don’t believe the old saying, “Build a better mousetrap and the world will beat a path to your door.” To me, the best products in the world need to be sold. Two examples of this are the Beta system for TV and the Apple Macintosh computers. Beta is the best system but VHS took over because the Beta people fell down on the selling job. Windows 98 is Macintosh ‘86 but again the engineers were not salesmen. Marion “Johnny” Johnson who was buried only about a half mile from his first magazine site proved that good selling is good citizenship. He could have sold any firstclass product, for he wouldn’t tolerate inferior items, and made a successful career of it, but he chose dynamite and the industry benefited from his talents.

Jan 1, 2004

By B. Papillon

There has been a veritable increase in the adoption of electronic detonators in the last few years. Electronic detonators offer several distinctive features over electric and non-el (shock tube) detonators including better timing accuracy resulting in excellent fragmentation and vibration control, certainly key mining parameters. The field programmability also helps in reducing the on-site magazine storage of detonators with diverse fixed delays. A typical electronic detonator may consist of a logic core, a communication interface, storage capacitor(s) and the ignition element. Being electronic components, the electronic detonators may be susceptible to RF or electromagnetic interference (EMI). RF sources are virtually everywhere: cellular phones/towers, radio transmission, microwaves, walkie-talkies, high voltage (HV) transmission cables and wireless networks with their characteristic frequency emissions. Safety issues prevail; e.g., whether the RF interference can cause premature or inadvertent firing whether directly or indirectly. From a reliability perspective, the RF interference may also impact on bus communications, e.g., during the logging, verifying, charging and firing phases. The deleterious communications disturbance may result in a misfire (non-firing of one or more of the detonators) which is terribly inconvenient for the mine operators and even pose a safety hazard.

Jan 1, 2009

By C B. McCampbell, R W. Jr Bickes

Sandia National Laboratories has developed a semiconductor bridge (SCB) igniter for the ignition of a variety of explosive materials. When subjected to a low-energy current pulse, the bridge bursts into a plasma causing rapid ignition of the explosive material pressed against the bridge. Despite the low energies required for ignition, SCB components have proven to be explosively safe, meeting both no-fire and electrostatic discharge (ESD) safety requirements.

Jan 1, 1991

By Bob Turnbull

The International Society of Explosives Engineers (ISEE), at its 1995 annual conference, established a Seismograph Standards Working Group to develop performance standards for blast vibration seismographs. This group was transformed into the Blast Vibration and Seismograph Section in 1997 with 5 working committees one of which was the Seismograph Standards Committee. Standards are essential to ensure that vibration records from different seismographs would report the same vibration levels within a stated tolerance. In 2000, the ISEE through the work of the Blast Vibration and Seismograph Section published the “Performance Specifications for Blasting Seismographs.” This document is available on the ISEE web site at www.isee.org/sections/blast.htm.

Jan 1, 2007

By David Ziegler

A formal blast plan is sometimes required for projects involving rock excavation. A written blast plan submitted with a bid proposal can also be an important sales tool. A blast plan will cover the basic elements of shot design: hole diameter, spacing, burden, loading, and so forth. Some suggestions are discussed here for additional items or topics to address, including: safety issues, ground control, traffic & site control, public relations, pre-blast inspections, seismic monitoring.

Jan 1, 2003

By Sarma S. Kanchibotla

In overburden cast blasting the explosive energy is used to move a significant percentage of overburden from the high wall to the spoil pile thus reducing the amount of material to be handled by machinery. However, the obvious trade-off between the extra explosive energy in the cast blast versus reduced dragline effort is complicated by an increased risk of damage to the underlying coal. This damage may not be obvious but inevitably leads to reduced coal recovery and may negate much of the benefit sought from cast blasting.

Jan 1, 1999

By Thierry Bernard, Phillipe Cappello, Jean Marc Laboz

"The main reasons of the emergence of electronic detonators are linked to:-Local urban development close to mining operation sites-Environment regulations"

Jan 1, 1995

By Alain Blanchier, Gilles Gomez

Neighborhood pressure on quarries has become urgent to deal with quarry managers and operators must apply the most recent technologies and communicate it for long shelf life time exploitation, the quarry in which the work is located in urban or suburban environments needs to take into account blasting rules as well as site environment. The main problems to be addressed are:

Jan 1, 2009

By Catherine Aimone-Martin, Mary-Alena Martell

Whole-structure and mid-wall responses of 33 non-traditional structures to surface coal mine blasting were characterized. Eighty-nine blasts were conducted at 11 mine sites throughout the U.S. to measure blastgenerated dynamic response of structures typically found in the proximity of surface coal mining. Structures selected for this study include log-type, manufactured (single- and double-wide trailers), “mine camp”-type, adobe, and stone. Traditional acoustic microphones, t&axial (ground) and single component (structure) velocity transducers were used to record airblast, ground motions, and structures response time histories with a common time base. Wall crack displacement gages were used to record static and dynamic movement of existing drywall cracks. The relative responses of selected “atypical” structures to blast vibrations and nonblasting causes of structural stress, including natural forces, environmental effects, and human habitation, are compared. The purpose of this study is to document and compare vibration characteristics of structures that were not included in previous studies conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Mines and others in establishing the widely adopted safe level blast vibration criteria in the U.S. An important objective of this study is to outline an evaluation process including structure uniqueness relative to cracking susceptibility.

Jan 1, 2002

By Cathy Aimone-Martin, Caitlin Woznick, Brent Meins

This study is a continuation of previous work in which the responses of tall structures to close-in construction blasting at two rock excavation sites are evaluated. A total of eight buildings were instrumented to calculate blast-induced wall strains. Of these structures, five high-rise buildings measuring 166 ft (51 m) to 294 ft (90 m) in height (15 to 24 stories), were included for this study and compared with the results of previous studies that included one to three story residential structures and mid-rise structures (four to six stories). All five structures were built between 1908 and 1940 with interior walls comprising aged plaster. Three of the structures are designated Landmark, subject to a 0.5 in/s (12.7 mm/s) regulated peak particle velocity (PPV) limit. The regulated PPV limit for the two other structures was 2.0 in/s (50.8 mm/s). To date, a total of 450 close-in construction blasts have taken place over six months at the two adjacent projects, blasting three to six times per day at each site. Seismograph instrumentation included tri-axial geophones in the ground and bi-axial geophones (horizontal components only) mounted on structure exteriors at the corners closest to blasting. Peak global wall tensile strains were calculated from time-correlated differential structure displacements in two horizontal directions as measured by upper and lower geophones mounted near the roof and at street levels. Wall strains were correlated with ground excitations to establish a stiffness factor for each structure defined as the upper bound linear regression slope for strain as a function of ground displacement. In addition, a structure-specific regression best-fit function was established to relate horizontal components of displacement to velocity. These two functions were used to determine the maximum ground motion velocity for a desired limit placed on wall strain. A 25 ?-strain limit was suggested for both projects to protect interior plaster walls. To date, global wall strains have not exceeded 0.53 ?-strains (or 47 times the project limit) for peak particle velocities up to 3.49 in/s (88.6 mm/s). This demonstrates the low strain response of tall structures to ground velocities well above regulated limits. The stiffness factor computed for the most flexible high-rise building was 688 in-1 (17475 mm-1). In comparison, stiffness factors for the most flexible residential and mid-rise structures previously studied were 8651 in-1 (219735 mm-1) and 4387 in-1 (111430 mm-1), respectively. Based on a large number of measurements made at these study structures, the maximum horizontal ground velocity needed to achieve 25 ?-strains in walls ranged from 36 in/s (914 mm/s) to 192 in/s (4877 mm/s) because of the high stiffness of these buildings. Such high amplitudes of ground vibrations can never be safely achieved during close-in blasting in urban environments. These excessive values stand to show how unfounded the current limits of 0.5 in/s (12.7 mm/s) and 2.0 in/s (50.8 mm/s) are when applied to massive, tall structures. This study demonstrated that upper structure motions are highly attenuated from the lower (street-level) motions because of the long travel distances up the buildings. High-rise structures are far stiffer than mid-rise and residential structures and can withstand ground vibration amplitudes far greater than the currently enforced blasting limits in New York City.

Jan 1, 2015