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By James S. Graham

Research at the University of Colorado on southern pine and Douglas-fir piling has determined that the existing building code design stress values of 1200 psi and 1250 psi, as determined by ASTM D-2899, are substantiated; but testing procedures should be revised. All full size piling tests should be standardized at 1/d ratios of 2:1, or confined tests performed. Also, it has been determined that theoretical design values for timber piling should not be based on the lumber criteria of D-245 and D-2555, but instead should follow the pattern set by engineers in the utility industry for timber poles, in accordance with ANSI 05.1.

Jan 1, 1986

By Alexander Sutulov

1. INTRODUCTION According to the classical economic approach of the open market economy, copper supply should be regulated by market forces which are (a) demand and (b) prices. In fact, demand is of primordial importance because prices are a reflection of supply-demand balance: they go up in times of shortages of supply and down when over-supply situation exists. In the past few years, this basic mechanism of market economy has been under pressure from a number of non-market forces, such as social and monetary problems of sane important copper producing countries; structural changes in copper mining companies through mergers with oil companies; and other factors which greatly contributed to distortion of the basic supply-¬demand equation. As a result, we have faced in the last three years a situation of oversupply rarely seen in the past, with a catastrophic fall in copper prices, huge losses at mines and unprecedented indebtedness of copper producers. This has deep repercussions in the copper business and its future supply outlook. This is particularly so when taking into consideration that high indebtedness and high interest rates conspire against the very survival of some traditional producers. As we write this comment (July of 1985), close to one half of U.S. copper production capacity is closed down, sane of it for good, while the same precarious situation exists in Canada, Australia, Zambia, and some other primary producers who cannot face present low prices with equally low costs. The question is then what this situation means for the medium-¬term future, until the end of this decade, Particularly when taking into consideration the fact that some of the factors influencing it are of a long-term character. 2. SUPPLY-DEMAND SITUATION IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS Since the last boon year, in 1979, when world copper consumption reached a record of 9.8 million metric tons of refined copper, demand dropped to only 9.0 million tons in 1982, when the crisis bottomed out, and then steadily recovered to the level of 9.7 million tons in 1984. Meanwhile, copper production, which in 1979 was only 9.4 million tons, in spite of the fall in demand, grew to 9.7 million tons in 1981 and 1983 and only temporarily was cut to 9.4 million tons in 1982 and to 9.5 million tons in 1984. As a result of this imbalance, hugh copper stocks were accumulated with supply systematically out¬growing demand by over 2 million tons at one time. With the Western World refined copper demand running at an average of 115,000 tons per week, this oversupply was equivalent to between 15 and 18 weeks production, i.e. twice as large as normal. This was immediately reflected in very low copper prices. Another contributing factor to relatively low copper prices was the lack of speculator interest for this commodity. Between 1981 and 1984 the world experienced a very intensive period of wealth distribution, high interest rates and intensive restructuring off world economy and its industrial sector. Therefore, much of the available money was attracted to more lucrative and attractive investments rather than to the lack-luster performance of copper, and for that matter, of the metal sector in general. The much announced and discussed recovery of the U.S. economy since 1983, and particularly in 1984, with an overall growth of the GNP by 6.8% in 1984, happened to be more oriented to the service sector than the industrial sector and therefore this recovery was not adequately reflected in copper consumption nor to metals in general. This put serious doubts about the future demand for copper. Consequently copper prices failed to improve in spite of an apparent fall in stocks and a healthy increase in the demand for copper since 1982. At the time of this writing (July, 1985), although same analysts claim that the available stocks are running at about 8 weeks of supply, which are considered to be below normal, copper prices are still very low at between 65 and 67 cents per pound of copper. Part of the answer may be the normal seasonal slow-down period in the Northern Hemisphere due to summer vacations and

Jan 1, 1986

Responsibility for the administration of mineral resources is divided between federal and provincial governments. The paper traces the evolution of mineral policies at both levels of government, from the end of World War II to the present. In the immediate post-World War II years, the emphasis was on supplying the raw material needs of a rapidly growing world economy. Policies favouring growth and development of the Canadian mining industry were instituted during this period. Two decades of uninterrupted expansion (the 1950s and 1960s) ensued. The decade of the 1970s was a turbulent one for Canadian mineral producers. Governments intervened more substantially than ever before. Moreover, the industry suffered from an intense period of competition for resource revenues by the two levels of government. At the same time, far reaching changes were taking place in the structure of world mineral markets. To date in the 1980s, the mineral industry has, perforce, adapted to existing mineral market structures. Mineral policies, too, have shown signs of adapting to the needs of the mineral industry. Whether the resulting mix of policies will permit the revitalization of the Canadian mining sector remains to be seen.

Jan 1, 1986

By Michel L. Bilodeau, Brian W. Mackenzie, Dallas W. Davis

"The paper formulates an evaluation procedure for examining the effects of location on the economics of developing mineral deposits. This methodology is applied to assess locational aspects of Nova Scotia's competitive position f or mine development relative to other Canadian regions and provinces. The appraisal concerns two representative mine development opportunities, a medium-size open-pit tungsten deposit, and a small underground gold deposit. The influence of regional economic conditions is initially assessed. Then, the consequences of taxation are isolated. Finally, the combined impact of regional and taxation conditions is examined. SettingThe economic potential of mining may be assessed in a number of ways. One approach, increasingly used for both corporate planning and government policy purposes, is to evaluate the competitive position of an actual or potential mineral producer in the international marketplace relative to other suppliers.Such examinations of competitive position vary from cost league comparisons of breakeven costs for operating mines, through the assessment of medium-term costs associated with developing new mine capacity, to long-term evaluations of the economics of mineral supply from the start of exploration. The complexity of the analysis increase s with the scope and timeframe of interest. Many factors are involved. One component of competitive position is the quality of the mineral resources available. Other key factors include existing technology, wage and salary rates, labour productivity, the cost of capital, infra structure requirements, distances from sources of materials supply an d to mineral markets, management attributes, organizational efficiency, government mineral policies (particularly taxation), and inflation and exchange rates. The paper fits within this competitive position framework.The variable economic conditions which exist within Canada have a direct bearing on the viability of mine development and, thereby, on mineral exploration potential. The paper examines locational aspects of Nova Scotia 's competitive position."

Jan 1, 1986

By Richards RG, Cross MS

The development of alluvial mining, processing systems and associated gravity separation technology over the last 30 years is largely linked to the mineral sands industry. Attention has been focussed on Australia in these areas of mineral resource development and technological Advancement.

Jan 1, 1986

By D. R. Wilburn

The Bureau of Mines investigated the potential availability of magnesium from 45 properties in market economy countries (MEC's). The 38 significant deposits evaluated have demonstrated resources of approximately 29 billion short tons (st) magnesium-bearing material containing 416 million short tons (MMst) magnesium oxide (MgO). Using data it gathered, the Bureau determined the magnesium production potential for each property including a 15-pct rate of return on invested capital. Total and annual availability assessments for the next 30 yr were completed for magnesium (Mg) metal, deadburned MgO, and caustic calcined MgO. At a January 1984 market price of $1.34/Ib Mg metal, the properties evaluated could economically produce an estimated 13 MMst Mg metal. At a market price of $400/st nonmetal magnesium product, these properties could economically produce 109 MMst deadburned MgO and 43 MMst caustic MgO. These properties could produce approximately 301,000 st Mg metal, 3.0 MMst deadburned MgO, and 430,000 st caustic MgO annually at current full production levels and 1984 market prices until at least the year 2000. Total 1984 MEC production assessed in this study was 153,000 st Mg metal and 4.3 MMst nonmetallic MgO products.

Jan 1, 1986

At the Waikato North Head Ironsand operation, NZ Steel Mining Ltd is using a Bucket Wheel Excavator û shiftable conveyor mining system to excavate Titanomagnetite bearing sand and clay. The system utilises two Bucket Wheel Excavators with a two level shiftable bench conveyor and common trunk conveyor to deliver the material to a processing plant. The system was commissioned in November 1984 and has proved itself to be a high capacity, low cost method of excavating. Techniques of handling high sand faces have been developed and the conveyor layouts are going through a process of change to cope with the variable geo technical conditions and remain within: the characteristics of the excavators. The safety requirements for operating the system have been of a high standard and the experience has increased the confidence of the Company and the Mines Department Inspector's, for the first Bucket Wheel Excavator Mining system in New Zealand.

Jan 1, 1986

By Ted Schwinden

It's my pleasure to welcome the Rocky Mountain Coal Institute to Montana. Now that you've ended a 74 year history of meeting outside our borders, I hope you'll be back more often. Even if I can't convince you to come back before 2060, when another 74 years will be up, I'm confident the Kalispell and Flathead Lake area will do the persuading for me. In recent weeks, I've made a number of speeches around the state pointing out just how wrong the revenue projections in Montana's state government made in April of '85 were when we came to April of '86. Since the middle of this month, Montana's legislators have been in Helena struggling to balance a state budget that, by the end of fiscal year '87, threatened to be some $88 million in the red. Other western states reliant on natural resource and agricultural economies have found themselves caught in the same deflationary spiral. The "window of opportunity" I proposed and the 1985 Montana Legislature passed, couldn't have been opened at a more difficult time. What was envisioned as an incentive to expand Montana's coal production, and our tax base, ran aground on low oil prices and excess hydroelectric power. De- spite the one-third severance tax rebate offered on new coal production, year-to-date figures published in the June 2nd Coal Week show that production in Montana is down almost 10 per- cent from last year. Again, we're not alone. Production in Wyoming is down 8 percent and in North Dakota, it has dropped 13 percent. An over- all 3 percent production decline in western states looks even worse when contrasted against a 12 percent increase for your eastern competitors. Montana's "window of opportunity" had the potential to be a significant signal to your industry. That potential was quickly tempered by the inability of Arab nations to stabilize world energy prices. If any of us had forgotten, the last twelve months have reminded western states that the well-being of our natural resource economies has a tremendous impact on the ability of all levels of government to provide services. The past year has also driven home that in the world of business and in the business of the world, risk-taking is still the name of the game. The Western Governors recognize the problems facing this industry - and our states - and we're prepared to fight for the future of western coal. In the past two decades, legitimate environmental concerns have created a vast body of new legislation affecting coal producers. The industry has been required to meet new reclamation standards - tough regulations relating to ground water, air quality and wildlife habitat. To the industry's credit, coal companies have hired professionals with the technical know-how to do it right. Rather than considering reclamation laws to be an unreasonable burden, today's coal company is more likely to view its reclamation efforts as a source of corporate pride. In a sense, the industry and the agencies which regulate it have matured together . . . although at times OSM is reluctant to admit that either of us capable of or willing to play by the rules. Certainly some abuses exist and OSM's oversight has been helpful in ensuring parity between those states willing to comply and those that would rather defy federal law. Nonetheless, penalizing the more modem and responsible western coal industry for abuses that occur elsewhere is both unfair and counterproductive. Federal penalties range from "cruel and unusual" reporting requirements to the proposed electricity tax that would effectively force utilities and ratepayers who have already met the sulphur emission standards to subsidize those who have dodged their cleanup responsibilities. As a member of the Alliance for Acid Rain Control, I have joined corporate leaders, academicians, environmental representa-

Jan 1, 1986

By W. J. S. Craigen, G. E. Wittur

"In the context of today's continuously changing world, there are many factors which must be considered when attempting to assess the ability of Canada's primary copper producers to remain competitive in the face of increasing competition in world markets. In this paper, we have attempted to document those factors that will have the greatest impact on the future viability of Canada's copper industry, and to suggest possible strategies to fully utilize whatever inherent advantages Canada may have to enhance its competitive position. Technological factors related to the efficiency of precious and by-product metals recovery, energy type and utilization efficiency, production and sale of sulphur by-products, and control of 502 emissions are given high priority in this evaluation of Canada's future needs to remain competitive. Particular emphasis is placed on assessing the relative viability of hydrometallurgical versus pyrometallurgical processes for copper; to address uniquely Canadian conditions and problems. Due consideration is also given to the economic incentives required to allow Canada's copper producers to compete under anticipated world market conditions and to facilitate the continued development of Canada's copper resources. IntroductionWhen we try to assess the viability or competitiveness of any industry the bottom line is still usually, ""Can we produce a pound of product cheaper than the competition?"" Canada's copper industry is certainly no exception. However, as with most resource-based industries dependent upon exports, there are many factors which have a significant effect on the cost components which make up the total cost of producing and selling a pound of copper. It is desirable therefore to have as clear a picture as possible of the cost components, the major factors affecting them, and how they compare with the competition, particularly the third-world copper producers.In this paper we have attempted to provide a brief outlook for world copper markets and a brief overview of Canada's competitive position. We have also attempted to document those factors which will have the greatest impact on future production costs, and have suggested possible initiatives to utilize inherent Canadian advantages to enhance our competitive position. Special emphasis has been placed on technological initiatives designed to make full use of these ""advantages"", to develop superior beneficiation and extraction! refining technologies. Major factors considered in the present study are:"

Jan 1, 1986

By Douglas F. Stevenson

Your committee doesn't assign any easy topics to us speakers. How do you define "successful" in what is essentially a losing game? I am reminded of the fellow who returned from a one-week vacation in Las Vegas, and proudly stated, "I only lost $150." To him, that was "success." I am afraid that workers' compensation is a losing game for employers, too, and success has to be defined in terms of how much or how little is lost. We have no chance of producing a profit for our employer. We will narrow down to some suggestions about conducting a workers' compensation program at the plant level, but first I want to discuss the general legal, social and legislative climate in which your plant program operates. Workers' compensation is a statutory program with its general parameters established by the legislature. These parameters are then amplified by the boards and commissions established to administer workers' compensation. What influences the legislature and the boards and commissions as they establish the framework in which we must function?

Jan 1, 1986

By Brian W. Mackenzie

The paper addresses five questions concerning the economic of gold exploration in the western Canadian shield. Can historical footprints be used to project future gold prices for exploration planning? Experience suggests that gold price forecast are too clo ely tied to current market events to provide meaningful guidelines. What range of breakeven gold price will typically be required to ju tify gold exploration in Canada? Minimum price requirements. initially asses ed at $540 to $1080 per ounce, probably lie in the range of $480 to $760 per ounce (expressed in 1985 Canadian dollar). Within Canada, what role do regional conditions and taxation policies play in determining the viability of prospective gold exploration targets? Striking interprovincial differences are found to exist, given the same geological circum tance -Nova Scotia, ew Brunswick, and Quebec rank towards the top in term of motivating exploration, Briti h Columbia provides the least investment incentive, while Saskatchewan and Manitoba place around the middle of the Canadian league. How can minimum acceptable tonnage-grade conditions for gold targets in the western shield be established and, then, constructively applied to provide exploration planning guidelines? Minimum target conditions, realis tically defined in terms of a broad band of doubt, can be used judiciously to help balance the direct costs of uneconomic exploration with the opportunity costs associated with rejecting economic deposits. How does the average cost per ounce of gold discovered in the western shield compare with the overall Canadian experience? Average discovery costs for the we tern shield, apprai ed at $100 per ounce, are shown to compare favourably with the Canada-wide record.

Jan 1, 1986

By John R. Marks

Introduction An engineer is a builder and a problem solver. He uses knowledge of the properties of matter and energy to furnish the needs of society. Engineers form the bridge between scientific researchers and the general public, most of whom are technologically illiterate. Mining, metallurgical, and petroleum engineers extract minerals from the ground and process them into usable forms. Then, other engineers further process them into society's needs. Minerals engineers deal with more uncertainty than other engineers. Each ore deposit has its own personality and each ore is metallurgically unique. Minerals engineers, therefore, must be flexible, often applying larger safety factors and contingencies than other engineers, and frequently functioning as a jack of all trades. A minerals engineer can work in coal, oil, oil shale, base metals, ferrous metals, precious metals, industrial minerals, strategic minerals, or in exploration. Other mining jobs include banking and financing, education and research, marketing and sales, and government. As a minerals engineer, you may be among the first to work on the ocean floor or the moon. College Preparation A difference between college and industry is the type of problems to be solved. A typical college problem has an exact answer derived from given information. An industry problem is more apt to have a solution chosen from a number of alternatives. Information required for the solution is not given. It must be measured, calculated, looked-up, estimated, or otherwise derived. Solutions involve trade-offs, economics, and human factors, as well as application of physical laws and theory. When a college problem is answered, you move on to the next one. In industry, however, the headaches may just be starting with the implementation of the solution. Students often complain that they see little use for the theory they are learning. This is valid. A good professor will link theory and practice. Another difference between college and industry is the price of failure. In college, you can make a half-hearted effort in an assignment and take your C or D. On the job, however, poor engineering results in potentially effective projects being rejected and unsound projects being undertaken. Poor performance results in cost overruns, schedule holdups, oversights, disgruntled employees, irate bosses, unsafe structures, and unreliable systems. The costs are time, money, and possibly lives. The student pays the university for his work - not the other way around. So the rewards for good schoolwork often seem nebulous. But education must be viewed as an investment. Working for good grades will help you think better, learn more, receive better job offers, and perform more effectively on the job. There is no substitute for hard work. Avoid taking the easiest electives. If you desire a more liberal education or dislike rigorous physical sciences, mathematics, or engineering courses, change majors. Remember, you are training to be an engineer, not a computer programmer or market analyst. At least one summer of industry employment is necessary for minerals engineering students. The sooner you gain actual experience, the sooner you will know whether to change majors. Most large companies hire students during summer. It is best to send out applications around Christmas break. First and second year students usually work as laborers. Upper-classmen may work as engineering technicians. Students must sometimes choose between returning to a company at a higher position or trying a different company at a lower position, for more varied experience. Both alternatives have advantages. Do your best on these summer jobs. The company is watching. If you do well, the chances are good you will get a job offer when you graduate. Good references are important when you begin job hunting. Interviewing occurs near the end of your school career. The standard procedure is to send your resume with a cover letter to each company you are interested in. The resume for a graduating engineer with little experience need not exceed one page. The cover letter must be written for the individual company.

Jan 2, 1985

By J. R. Walls

The United States potash industry had its beginning in the early Colonial days. Potash was initially manufactured by leaching of hardwood ashes in large iron pots. Production of potash was recorded as early as 1631 in New Hampshire, and in Maine a few years later. According to the census of 1850, the production of potash was America's most thriving chemical industry and, at that time, 569 plants were reported producing potash from wood ashes. Interest in potash was so great prior to the 1800's that the very first United States patent, signed by George Washing- ton, was granted for the production of potash on July 31, 1790. A new era for the production of potash began when potash was discovered by the analysis from a brine well in 1839 near Stassfurt, Germany while exploring for salt. The predominant use of potash at that time was in the chemical industry rather than agriculture. The discovery, by Justice von Liebig in about 1858, that potash salt contributed greatly to the essential plant food in soil opened up an enormous potential market for a suitable potash material.

Jan 1, 1985

By L. M. Pero

The paper summarizes aspects of the recent literature on mineral development in the Third World. The emphasis is on publications covering agreements between host governments and mining companies.

Jan 1, 1985

By C. P. Mishra

The Bureau of Mines performed a study of the availability of cobalt from market economy countries. The study entailed the detailed analysis of 97 deposits which contain 3.9 billion lb of cobalt at the demonstrated level; in 94 of the deposits cobalt is recovered as a byproduct, and in 3 it is considered the primary product. Since 97 pet of all recoverable cobalt is derived as a byproduct from copper and nickel deposits, the report focused on these two sources. At an assumed market price of $0.89flb for copper, $3.45/lb for nickel, $475/tr 021 for platinum, and $7/lb for cobalt, 1,330 million lb of cobalt at the demonstrated level are potentially available. This total includes 1,105 million lb of cobalt from copper properties, 190 million lb from nickel, 29 million lb from platinum, and 6 million lb from primary cobalt. This analysis indicates that the production cost for 589 million lb of cobalt can be totally covered by the revenues obtained from the other metals produced. The impacts of increases in capital investment and energy costs are also discussed.

Jan 1, 1985

By H. E. Hilliard

The Bureau of Mines investigated hydrometallurgical procedures for concentrating precious metals from a mechanically processed metal fraction of obsolete military electronic scrap. Feed material for the leaching procedures described in this report was the high-tension-separated metal concentrate obtained as a fraction from mechanically processing partially stripped electronic units. Initial pretreatment with a 20-wt-pct-NaOH solution solubilized most of the aluminum. After washing, the resulting residue was incinerated to destroy any organics attached to metal particles. The incinerated residue was leached with 20-vol-pct H2S04 solution using two methods, countercurrent pressure and ultrasonic-aided leaching to solubilize the base metals, predominantly copper. Silver was recovered from the base metal leach residue using 50-vol-pct HN03, and gold contaminated with several percent palladium was recovered from the silver leach residue using aqua regia. The impure silver and gold plus palladium products represent about 1.5 wt pct of the high-tension-separated metal concentrate. Included is a three-step process evaluation study of mechanical processing of general electronic scrap and two hydrometallurgical procedures for leaching high-tension-separated metallic concentrates obtained from the mechanical processing step. Process evaluation concluded that only mechanical processing is economically viable.

Jan 1, 1985

By William J. Potter, Roger N. Pyle

Introduction The primary ingredient for survival of mining companies during a recessionary period is to be innovative and resourceful in the structuring and financing of operations. Over the past decade, many mining companies have had to retrench and restructure their operations and to redeploy their assets just to survive. During the same period, traditional sources of financing for mining companies -- commercial banks, subsidized export credit loans and long term straight debt financing in the public markets -- became less available and more expensive. Meanwhile, new markets and new financing instruments provided new alternatives for mining companies. Those companies which exploited these alternatives greatly enhanced their capacity for survival and even for profitability. This article considers the strategies adopted by some companies to adapt to changes in this recessionary environment; the inadequacy of traditional sources of financing; certain of the new financing instruments, structures and markets which have become available; and how several mining companies have utilized these new instruments, structures and financial markets to improve their competitive positions. THE IMPACT OF RECESSION ON MINING COMPANIES AND TRADITIONAL FINANCING SOURCES In its 1983 year-end article "The New Economic Order" Mining Journal characterized many of the large private sector mining companies with operations in the industrialized countries as being "gripped between the jaws of high working costs and stagnating metal commodity prices." The article went on to characterize the Canadian mining industry in particular as being "in the difficult position of having to seek to sell the bulk of its output in a world market characterized by over-capacity, where production costs were determined by internal political and economic factors while prices were set by external competitive forces of supply and demand." Miners of a wide range of commodities in the industrialized countries have come to realize that their domestic mineral resources are in many cases no longer competitive with global sources of supply. To compete and survive they would have to rely on their technical and financial expertise in mineral exploration and development and in mining and processing. Strategies For Survival Global competition has compelled management in the extractive industries to improve their worldwide cost position. This is the only means whereby a mining company can differentiate its product and attain a substantial competitive advantage. During the past decade, for example, ASARCO Inc. and Inco Ltd. chopped their payrolls, postponed expansion plans and otherwise retrenched. ASARCO reduced its capital expenditures and cash requirements for operations in 1984 to a level almost equal to its internally generated cash. The company's finances were also strengthened by increasing total lines of credit from outside sources, by selling common stock, and by reducing annual pension funding through a change in actuarial assumptions. Other companies returned to their traditional organizational structure where they had a demonstrated competitive strength. Consolidated Gold Fields, for instance, resumed its operation as a mining finance house. Its capital investment programs are now devoted solely to resource development. In mid-1984, at a time of firming zinc prices, Union Miniere S.A. used the opportunity to integrate its smelting capacity and to direct investment to certain subsidiaries at the expense of less viable operations. Smaller corporations realized that it was not enough just to be the low-cost producer. For example, Drummond Coal Company in Alabama, which dominates its regional market due to its low-costs, has also developed a world-wide trading capability and has placed incremental tonnage from its own mines as well as brokered coal produced by others, thereby minimizing capital risk. In Canada, Campbell Resources has exploited difficult times by acquiring assets cheaply. In the process it improved its capacity to withstand cyclical economic swings by diversifying from solely a copper and gold producer to a company based upon asbestos, coal, copper, gold and natural gas.

Jan 1, 1985

By Wesley W. Eckles

Microcomputer technology has begun to revolutionize petroleum engineering. Petroleum engineers' use of relatively inexpensive personal computers (PC's) is likely to continue expanding rapidly. Since 1982 SPE's Microcomputer Applications Committee has developed a Society-wide users group, a bi-monthly newsletter (MICROCOMP NEWS), an SPE Short Course, a hardware and software distribution program, and a world wide electronic network (SPE NET). The purpose of this paper is to share SPE's experience in creating a dynamic program for meeting the individual member's need in the application of microcomputers to petroleum engineering. My hope is that this will encourage other engineering and scientific organizations to provide similar programs for their members.

Jan 1, 1985

By W. S. Cavender

The Round Mountain mining district, Nye County, Ne- vada, was discovered in 1906 on claims owned by Lewis D. Gordon. Initial mining operations uncovered gold veins of spectacular richness, and within a few days of discovery, Gordon sold his controlling interest for some $87,000. From this sale emerged the Round Mountain Mining Co., predecessor of Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines, Inc., the latter destined to become the major property owner in the area. Vein mining in the district continued sporadically into the early 1930s, yielding 9.3 Mg (330,000 oz) of gold plus substantial silver credits from approximately 626 kt (690,000 st) of ore. In addition to the lode deposits, the early miners recognized the placer potential in the alluvial fan material accumulated around the west and north sides of Round Mountain itself. Intermittent placer operations were carried out for a number of years, and in the 1940s and 1950s, Round Mountain Gold Dredging Co. worked the placers under a lease from Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines. The last placer operation terminated in 1959 when it, like some of its predecessors, proved uneconomic. Total placer production for the district is estimated at 3657 km (4 million yd) of gravel containing 59 Mg (210,000 oz) of gold and possibly 2.0 to 2.3 Mg (70,000 to 80,000 oz) of silver. Round Mountain is a small hill situated on the east flank of the Toquima Range in central Nevada. The hill is com- posed of relatively flat-lying Tertiary rhyolitic ash flow tuffs, which overlie Paleozoic metasediments and Cretaceous granites. Throughout the surrounding Round Mountain mining district, most of the known gold ores occur in the tuffs, although the metasediments and granites are also mineralized. Mineralization is structurally controlled, principally by a series of northwest-trending shears and shattered zones. Vein, stockwork, and disseminated ores occur, usually containing simple quartz-pyrite-gold mineral assemblages. The gold itself is electrum, having a silver content of 30% to 40%. In September, 1967, Elwood Dietrich, a prospector and mine promoter, obtained a purchase option on the 4452 ha (1 1,000 acres) of mineral rights held at Round Mountain by Nevada Porphyry Gold Mines. The original option had a buy-out price of $1 million and was established through Dietrich's friendship with officers of Nevada Porphyry. In April, 1968, Dietrich conveyed his option to Ordrich Gold Reserves Co., a partnership created by a group of west coast investors, mostly employees of the airline industry. There- after, Ordrich invested considerable funds in trying to test and develop the property, but soon recognized the need to seek financial and technical support from the mining industry. In December, 1968, Dietrich contacted Wayne Cavender, then Regional Geologist, Southwest, for Copper Range Exploration Company (CRX) in Tucson, Arizona, and made a data presentation. Shortly thereafter, Cavender was appointed Manager of Exploration and Chief Geologist for Copper Range Co. (parent company of CRX), New York City, and he asked C. Phillips Purdy, CRX Regional Geologist, Northwest, to make an initial property examination. Purdy's one-week field study took place in March, 1969, and resulted in a recommendation that CRX pursue its investigation of the property. The presence of low-grade gold mineralization in both the alluvial gravels and in the bedrock was verifiable, but the placer was deemed to have the greater immediate economic mining potential. At that time, gold was in the $1.41/g ($40 per oz) price range. Working from Purdy's information, Cavender decided to attempt acquisition of the property, and the first in a long series of negotiations was initiated with Ordrich. Basically, CRX felt that the placer had a promising potential for several reasons, including (I) past operators had recovered free gold but not the gold contained in the pebble fraction of the gravels; (2) past operations appeared to have been ineffectively designed or managed and not costefficient; and (3) the price of gold appeared to be poised for an upward move. Negotiations with Ordrich were prolonged and difficult, with CRX competing against several ma* mining companies, but finally an agreement was reached, effective June I, 1970. Gold was then back to $35. It is believed that, in

Jan 1, 1985

By S. S. M. Chan

The Bureau of Mines has investigated the structural aspects of shafts and support systems using the finite-element technique. In situ field measurements in deep, vein-type metal mines show that rock stresses are often higher in the horizontal direction than the vertical, and unequal in the horizontal plane. These data and laboratory and field-determined physical properties were used as input to analytical studies. Various design and construction parameters were investigated to deter-mine the effect on shaft stability. Rectangular shafts were studied in detail to determine the effects of applied stress ratio, shaft orientation and dimension, influence of interbedded quartzite and argillite, and rock fracturing. Various support systems were analyzed, including concrete lining, timber, and steel sets. Circular configurations were investigated to evaluate yield zones and liner thickness. Elliptical shafts and time effects were briefly evaluated to illustrate shape and time effects and demonstrate the methodology. It is shown that the magnitude, direction, and ratio of applied stress and rock mass anisotropy are keys to determining shaft stability. A realistic conceptual framework was developed with which to examine the rock and support interaction in deep mine shafts. Structural analysis techniques overcome some of the historical difficulties with shaft de-sign by defining the field data requirements and structural sensitivity of various design and construction parameters.

Jan 1, 1985